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The debate over secured credit continues.1 In recent years scholars have
discussed the reasons for secured credit, whether the use of secured credit
is efficient, and ultimately whether the law should facilitate or even permit
secured transactions.2 A prominent issue in the debate over secured credit

1. "The debate has smoldered in the academic literature like a coal mine fire for fifteen years
and gives no indication of burning out any time soon." Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured
Creditor'sBargain,80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1890 (1994) (footnote omitted) (quoting Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Easy Casefor the Priorityof Secured Claimsin Bankruptcy,47 DuKE L.J. 425,427
n.1 (1997)). The debate has now continued for almost twenty years.
2. See Barry E. Adler, An Equity-Agency Solution to the Bankruptcy-PriorityPuzzle, 22 J.
LEGAL STUD. 73,74 (1993); Douglas G. Baird, The Importanceof Priority,82 CoRNELLL. REV.
1420, 1420 (1997) [hereinafterBaird,Importance ofPriority];see, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Security
Interests Reconsidered, 80 VA. L. REV. 2249 (1994); Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency
JustificationforSecured Transactions:Foxes withSoxes andOtherFancifulStuff, 42 KAN. L. REV.
13 (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALEL.J. 857 (1996) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case];
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Casefor the Priority of Secured Claims in
Bankruptcy: Further Thoughts and a Reply to Critics, 82 CoRNELL L. REV. 1279 (1997)
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Fried, FurtherThoughts]; James W. Bowers, Whither WhatHits the Fan?:
Murphy's Law, Bankruptcy Theory, and the Elementary Economics of Loss Distribution,26 GA.
L. REV. 27, 57-68 (1991); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy PriorityPuzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393
(1986); David G. Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994);
Theodore Eisenberg & Stefan Sundgren, Is Chapter11 Too Favorableto Debtors?Evidencefrom
Abroad, 82 CoRNELLL. REV. 1532 (1997); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Measuring
the Social Costs and Benefits and Identifying the Victims of SubordinatingSecurity Interests in
Bankruptcy, 82 CoRNELLL. REV. 1349 (1997) [hereinafter Harris &Mooney, Measuringthe Social
Costs];Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr.,A Property-BasedTheory ofSecurityInterests
Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously,80 VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994) (hereinafter Harris & Mooney, A
Property-BasedTheory]; Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financingand
PrioritiesAmong Creditors,88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Adding Another
Piece to the FinancingPuzzle: The Role ofReal PropertySecuredDebt, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 317
(1991); Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Explaining CreditorPriorities,80 VA. L. REV. 2103
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is the treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy,3 with some scholars
favoring the status quo, which gives secured creditors priority over
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy,' and others arguing for a system that
places secured and unsecured creditors on a more even playing field.'

(1994); Kenneth N. Klee, Barbariansat the Trough:Riposte in Defense of the Warren Carve-Out
Proposal, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1466 (1997); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in
Commercial and CorporateSettings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Lynn M. LoPucki, Should the
Secured CreditCarve OutApply Only in Bankruptcy? A Systems/StrategicAnalysis, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 1483 (1997); LoPucki, supra note 1; Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlementsof
the Government: Whose Money Is ItAnyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995) [hereinafter Mann,
Bankruptcy]; Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625
(1997); Ronald J. Mann, The FirstShallbeLast:A ContextualArgumentforAbandoningTemporal
Rules of Lien Priority,75 TEX. L. REV. 11 (1996) [hereinafter Mann, FirstShall Be Last]; Ronald
J. Mann, Secured Creditand Software Financing, 85 CORNE.L L. REV. 134 (1999) [hereinafter
Mann, Software Financing]; Randal C. Picker, Security Interests, Misbehavior,and Common
Pools, 59 U. CI. L. REV. 645 (1992); Schwarcz, supra note 1; Alan Schwartz, The Continuing
Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Priority Contractsand
Priorityin Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELLL. REV. 1396 (1997); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and
Bankruptcy Priorities:A Review of CurrentTheories, 10 J. LEGALSTUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz,
A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); Robert E. Scott, A RelationalTheory
of Secured Financing,86 COLuiM. L. REV. 901 (1986); Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured
Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436 (1997); Paul M. Shupack, Defending Purchase Money
Security Interests UnderArticle9 of the UCCfrom ProfessorBuckley, 22 IND. L. REV. 777 (1989);
Paul M. Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions,41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067, 1118
(1989); George G. Triantis, SecuredDebt Under ConditionsofImperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1992); Elizabeth Warren, Making PolicywithlmperfectInformation:TheArticle9 Full
PriorityDebates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373 (1997); James J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor
PersonalPropertySecurity, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984); William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist
and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts,and the Article 9 Reform Process,82
CORNELLL. REV. 1511 (1997).

3. See Adler, supra note 2, at 74; see, e.g., Bowers, supra note 2; Buckley, supra note 2,
Eisenberg & Sundgren, supra note 2; Harris & Mooney, Measuringthe Social Costs, supranote
2; LoPucki, supra note 2; Mann, Bankruptcy, supra note 2; Schwarcz, supra note 1; Schwartz,
PriorityContracts,supra note 2; Schwartz, Security Interests, supra note 2.
4. See Baird, Importance of Priority,supra note 2, at 1435; see, e.g., Harris & Mooney,
Measuring the Social Costs, supra note 2; Schwarcz, supra note 1.
5. See Bebchuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case, supra note 2 (proposing a 25% carve-out of
secured claims in bankruptcy); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors,
91 CoLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1643-49 (1991) (proposing priority for tort claimants); LoPucki, supra
note 1 (proposing priority for involuntary creditors both in and outside of bankruptcy); Mann, First
Shall Be Last, supra note 2 (proposing changes in the treatment of priorities in construction
financing); Mann, Software Financing, supra note 2 (proposing changes in the treatment of
software financing); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules and Social
Justice, 1994 U. IL. L. REV. 1, 31-34 (proposing priority for tort claimants); Robert K. Rasmussen
& David A. Skeel, Jr., The EconomicAnalysis of CorporateBankruptcyLaw, 3 AM. BANKR. INST.
L.REV. 85,86 (1995) (proposing priority for tort claimants); MemorandumfromElizabeth Warren,
Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, to the Council of the American Law Institute
1-2 (Apr. 25, 1996) [hereinafter Warren Memorandum to the ALl] (on file with author) (proposing
a 20% carve-out of a debtor's assets applicable both in and outside of bankruptcy to commercial
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An issue mostly left out of the debate is the constitutionality of major
modifications to the treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy. At least
some scholars feel that the Takings Clause does not limit prospective
bankruptcy legislation. I disagree. The Takings Clause does limit the power
of Congress to impair the rights of secured creditors in bankruptcy, even
prospectively, and my purpose in this Article is to explain why.
Scholars proposing changes to the treatment of secured creditors in
bankruptcy have relied on an understanding of the Takings Clause that
over time has proven to be incorrect. More than fifteen years ago, Professor
James Steven Rogers published an article in the HarvardLaw Review on
the relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause.6
In his article Professor Rogers focused on the impairment of the rights of
secured creditors in reorganization proceedings in exploring the extent to
which the Fifth Amendment limits the bankruptcy power.7 He first
concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not impose any limitations upon
the power of Congress to enact purely prospective legislation impairing
security interests, going so far as to suggest that "no takings clause issue
[could] ever be presented by a truly prospective statute."' His reasoning
was that property rights of secured creditors are redefined by changes in
bankruptcy law, and he also assumed that the rights of secured creditors are
no different from the rights of unsecured creditors. 9 He ultimately
concluded that the Bankruptcy Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment
limits Congressional power with respect to prospective bankruptcy
legislation, and he criticized the Supreme Court's application of Fifth
Amendment principles even to retroactive legislation. °
Since Professor Rogers published his article, the Supreme Court has
made defining changes in the landscape of takings jurisprudence"' and has
loans secured by Article.9 security interests); Letter from Jay L. Westbrook, Benno C. Schmidt
Chair of Business Law, University of Texas School of Law, to the Council of the American Law
Institute 5-6 (Sept. 4, 1996) (on file with author) (proposing a carve-out only in bankruptcy).
6. James Steven Rogers, The Impairmentof Secured Creditors'Rights in Reorganization:
A Study of the Relationship Between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy Clause, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 973, 973 (1983).
7. See id. at 986.
8. Id. at 987 n.59.
9. See id. at 987-89.
10. See id. at l031.
11. The Supreme Court has decided numerous takings cases since its 1982-83 term. See
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 2137 (1998); see, e.g., Phillips v. Washington Legal
Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (1997);
Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Concrete
Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993); Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992);
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Connolly v. Pension
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implicitly rejected Professor Rogers' approach to defining the scope of
property rights." Yet discussion of the takings issue in the context of the
secured credit debate has not reflected these changes in takings
jurisprudence. Although a number of scholars published articles addressing
Fifth Amendment limitations on bankruptcy law before Professor Rogers, 3
none have explored the issue since. 4 Prominent scholars have accepted his
conclusions about prospective bankruptcy legislation without challenge.15
More importantly, scholars proposing changes to the treatment of secured
creditors in bankruptcy have assumed the constitutionality of their

Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
12. See infra Part m.C. Even before his article, the Court had rejected his assertion that the
rights of secured creditors are no different from the rights of unsecured creditors. See infra notes
172-74 and accompanying text.
13. See Vein Countryman, Real Estate Liens in Business Rehabilitation Cases, 50 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 303, 334-39 (1976); Vern Countryman, Treatment of Secured Claims in Chapter
Cases, 82 COM. LJ. 349, 355-60 (1977); see, e.g., Patrick A. Murphy, Restraint and
Reimbursement: The Secured Creditorin ReorganizationandArrangementProceedings,30 Bus.
LAW. 15 (1974); Patrick A. Murphy, Use of Collateralin Business Rehabilitations:A Suggested
Redrafting of Section 7-203 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 63 CAL. L. REV. 1483 (1975); Robert
J. Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: CorporateReorganizationandthe Secured Creditor'sRights
of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1975); George C. Webster II, Collateral Control
Decisionsin ChapterCases-ClearRulesv. JudicialDiscretion,51 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1977);
Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power: Chapter XII Real Property
Arrangements,52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 362 (1977); Note, Conrailand Liquidation Value: Creditors'
andStockholders'Entitlementin the RegionalRailReorganization,85 YALEL.J. 371 (1976); Note,
Takings and the PublicInterestin RailroadReorganization,82 YALEL.J. 1004 (1973); Comment,
The SecuredCreditor'sRight to Full LiquidationValue in CorporateReorganization,42 U. Cml.
L. REV. 510 (1975).
14. One article discusses relevant cases and commentary, including Professor Rogers' article,
in the context of continuing legal education for practitioners. See Frank R. Kennedy, Bankruptcy
and the Constitution, in BLSINGS OF LIBERTY: THE CONSTrUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
131, 151-59 (American Law Inst.-American Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing Professional Educ.
ed., 1988). Another article discusses constitutional limitations on the bankruptcy power, but
excludes the Takings Clause issue. See Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits ofBankruptcy,
63 TENN. L. REV. 487, 490 n.13 (1996). A few articles discuss the takings issue only in the context
of a particular provision of, or issue in, bankruptcy. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute
PriorityAfter Ahlers, 87 MICH. L. REV. 963,979-84 (1989); Ralph R. Mabey & Jamie A. Gavrin,
ConstitutionalLimitationson the DischargeofFuture Claims in Bankruptcy,44 S.C. L. REV. 745,
762-71 (1993).

15. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, CorporateReorganizationsand the
Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on Adequate Protection of Secured
Creditorsin Bankruptcy,51 U. CHI. L.REV. 97,100 (1984); David G. Carlson, PostpetitionInterest
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 577, 585-86 (1989); Theodore Eisenberg, The
UndersecuredCreditorin Reorganizationsandthe Natureof Security,38 VAND. L. REV. 931,952
n.69 (1985); Thomas H. Jackson,Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy,36 STAN. L. REV. 725,736 n.29
(1984); Steven L. Schwarcz, ProtectingRights, Preventing Windfalls: A Modelfor Harmonizing
State and FederalLawson FloatingLiens, 75 N.C.L. REV. 403,405 n.4 (1997); Jay L. Westbrook,
A FunctionalAnalysis of Executory Contracts,74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 262 n.160 (1989).
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*proposals based on his reasoning.1 6 In addition, courts have continued to
struggle in applying the takings doctrine in the bankruptcy context. Some
courts have adopted Professor Rogers' reasoning with respect to
prospective bankruptcy legislation, 7 while others have continued to rely
on cases and concepts he criticized." The time has come, therefore, to
revisit the issue of takings in bankruptcy.
Like Professor Rogers, I will focus primarily on the impairment of the
rights of secured creditors,1 9 and I will ultimately consider the extent to
which the bankruptcy power is limited by the Takings Clause.2' Professor
Rogers was concerned with the rights of secured creditors because of
attention at that time to the problem of interim restraints on their rights in
reorganization proceedings. 2 I am concerned with the rights of secured
creditors because of the secured credit debate. I will focus on the rights of
secured creditors with security interests in both real and personal
property." In addition, I will consider the effect of bankruptcy on other

16. See Bebchuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case, supra note 2, at 932; LoPucki, supra note 1, at
1952-54; see also Steve Knippenberg, The Unsecured Creditor'sBargain:An Essay in Reply,
Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REV. 1967, 1974 (1994) (citing Professor Rogers in support of
Professor LoPucki's proposal).
17. See Patriot Portfolio, LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 164 F.3d 677, 686 (1st Cir.
1999) ("Because Patriot's property rights in the lien are circumscribed by the debtor's ability under
the Code to avoid the lien, prospective application of § 522(f) does not constitute a 'taking' of
Patriot's property interest... ."); Bruin Portfolio, LLC v. Leicht (In re Leicht), 222 B.R. 670, 683
n.19 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998) ("If his property rights are defined by reference to existing law,
obviously no taking has occurred."). The results in these cases are probably correct, but the
reasoning is faulty. See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
18. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Burlington, 878 F.2d 354, 359 (lth Cir. 1989) ("It is
undisputed that the takings clause of the fifth amendment protects certain of the rights of secured
creditors.") (citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935)); United Say.
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d
1380, 1390 n.14 (1986) ("[Tjhe Fifth Amendment requires only that the value of the secured
position of a creditor be maintained during the stay.") (citing Wright v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
311 U.S. 273,278 (1940)).
19. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 974.
20. Professor Rogers was concerned with the Contracts Clause and the Due Process Clause
as well. See id. at 974. In this Article, I focus only on the Takings Clause.
21. See id.Congress had enacted the Bankruptcy Code, making changes to the reorganization
proceedings, only five years earlier. See infranote 28 and accompanying text. Also, commentators
had recently been concerned with the treatment of secured creditors in reorganizations. See supra
note 13. In addition, an important developing issue was whether undersecured creditors were
entitled to interest on their claims. See infra note 208 and accompanying text.
22. I will use the general term "security interest" in this Article to refer to the interest of a
secured creditor in either real or personal property created by agreement with the debtor. The
Bankruptcy Code defines security interest as "a lien created by an agreement." 11 U.S.C. § 101(51)
(1994).
I will use the term "property" to refer to the entire bundle of rights that an owner may have with
respect to a tract of land or an item of personal property, whether tangible or intangible. The term

BANKRUP-TCY TAKINGS

property interests, such as the interest of the tenant of a bankrupt landlord,
in ultimately addressing the bigger issue of the extent to which the Takings
Clause limits the power of Congress to revise bankruptcy law.
Unlike Professor Rogers, I believe that the Takings Clause is a vital
consideration in determining the treatment of secured creditors in
bankruptcy. This Article will explain why the Takings Clause is relevant
and why scholars engaged in the debate over secured credit must consider
the constitutionality of their proposals in light of the takings issue. In Part
I of the Article, I explore the ways in which current bankruptcy law
provides protection and gives deference to property rights. I also discuss
certain proposals that would reduce the protection given to secured parties.
Part R provides an overview of takings law and discusses some of the cases
in which the Supreme Court has addressed takings issues in the context of
bankruptcy.
In Part IH of the Article, I dispute the validity of certain assumptions
that have been used by courts and scholars as the basis for dismissing the
bankruptcy takings problem. Most of these assumptions are based on
conclusions reached by Professor Rogers in his article. However, some of
Professor Rogers' conclusions were incorrect even at the time of his
article. Some of his conclusions were normative and, therefore, should not
be the basis for assumptions about the constitutionality of proposals made
in the secured credit debate. Finally, some of his reasoning has proven
incorrect over time as the Supreme Court has expanded upon the meaning
of the Takings Clause. Because these assumptions about the bankruptcy
takings problem are faulty, the problem must be reevaluated.
In Part IV of this Article, I discuss the application of current takings
doctrine to present bankruptcy law and to proposals made in the context of
the secured credit debate. First, I look at the problem of delay for secured
creditors and at lien avoidance provisions under current bankruptcy law.
I conclude that the lien avoidance provisions are constitutional and that
only the most extraordinary case of delay for a secured creditor could
constitute a taking. Next, I consider the assertion made by several scholars,
based on Professor Rogers' reasoning, that Congress could completely
invalidate security interests in bankruptcy on a prospective basis.23 I

"property" may therefore also refer to the land or thing itself, in the less technical use of the word.
I will use the terms "property right," "property interest" and "interest in property" to refer to some
right or bundle of rights that constitutes less than the full bundle of sticks. See Thomas E. Plank,
The Outer Boundariesof the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L.J. 1193, 1200-13 (1998) (giving a
more detailed discussion of the use of these terms in the context of bankruptcy). See generallyJAN
G. LATos, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTEcrION: LIMITATIONS ON GOvERNMENTAL POWERS §
5.01 (1999) (discussing three meanings of the term "property"-the thing itself, the legal rights in
the thing, and the ownership of the thing).
23. See infra Part V.B.
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conclude that this assertion is incorrect. Scholars are currently debating the
merits of proposals that would drastically reduce the rights of secured
creditors in bankruptcy without considering the takings issue at all.' Some
of these proposals may be unconstitutional. At minimum, they raise
significant and complex issues under the Takings Clause, many of which
are so fact-dependant that they will be a source of uncertainty for years to
come.
I. BANKRUPTCY LAW

The Constitution gives Congress the power "[t]o establish... uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."2- There
was no lasting federal bankruptcy system in place until 1898, when
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.26 The Act remained in
effect for eighty years with substantial changes made during the
Depression.27 More recently, bankruptcy law is embodied in the
Bankruptcy Code, which was enacted in 19782" and was amended in
1984,29 1986,30 and 1994.31
Early bankruptcy laws were solely for the benefit of creditors,3 2 but
modem bankruptcy law provides protection for debtors as well. The dual

24. A large portion of my discussion of takings in the bankruptcy context is based not on
existing bankruptcy law but on changes to bankruptcy law that have been proposed or discussed
by various scholars, primarily in the context of the secured credit debate. Many of the articles
contain a paragraph dismissing the takings problem. Frequently, this dismissal is based on Professor
Rogers' argument that prospective legislation defines the property rights of a secured creditor. See
Rogers, supra note 6, at 974. In other articles, the basis is that a security interest should not be
treated as an interest in property.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). Congress had enacted short-lived bankruptcy
statutes in the 1800s. See Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19,
1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealedby Act of Mar. 3,
1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealedby Act of June
7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99. Many states had bankruptcy and insolvency statutes that filled the
void during the periods in between; see Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historyof the BankruptcyLaws
in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 12-13 (1995).
27. Amendments during the Depression included the Frazier-Lemke Act and the Chandler
Act. See Frazier-Lemke Act, ch. 869,48 Stat. 1289 (1934), discussed below in Part ll.B.; Chandler
Act, ch. 575,52 Stat. 840 (1938), which was the most substantial and comprehensive amendment.
See Tabb, supra note 26, at 28-29.
28. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11
U.S.C.).
29. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333.
30. See Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088.
31. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106.
32. See Tabb, supra note 26, at 14.
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policies of modem bankruptcy law are the fresh start policy, discharging
individual debtors from most debts in exchange for surrendering either
nonexempt assets or a portion of future income, and the policy protecting
creditors from each other by providing a mandatory forum for the fairest
distribution of available assets to creditors. 3 When bankruptcy law, in
furtherance of these or other policies, prevents creditors from taking
actions otherwise available to them, contract and property rights are
impaired. The question addressed in this Article is the extent to which the
Constitution permits the impairment of property rights, especially the
rights of secured creditors.
A. Protectionof PropertyInterests
UnderCurrentBankruptcy Law
Legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates that the drafters
of the Code considered the Fifth Amendment to be a limitation upon the
impairment of property rights in bankruptcy,' and current bankruptcy law
does give great deference to property rights.35 When a debtor files a
bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy estate is created and includes "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property" at the time of filing.3 6 There
may be items of property in which both the debtor and another party own
interests. For example, the debtor may be a landlord of property in which
tenants have interests, may have only the rights of a tenant in a third party
landlord's property, or may own property in co-tenancy with other parties.
In addition, the debtor may have granted security interests in property to
secured parties. I will first examine the rights of secured creditors in
bankruptcy. Then I will discuss some examples of the treatment of other
property rights in bankruptcy.
A basic understanding of the workings of bankruptcy is helpful in order
to understand how the Bankruptcy Code protects the property rights of
secured creditors. Most debtors entering voluntary bankruptcy have two
choices: liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or
33. See THOMAS H.JACKSON, THE LOGICAND LIMITS OFBANKRUPTCYLAW4 (1986); TERESA
A. SULUVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS:
BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 20 (1989). Some scholars have argued that

bankruptcy law should also be used to promote other worthwhile social policies. See Elizabeth
Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92 MiCH. L. REV. 336, 344 (1993).
34. Both House and Senate Reports indicate that the reason for the adequate protection

requirement was based on the constitutional requirements under the Fifth Amendment. See S. REP.
No. 989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 49 (1978), reprintedin1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; H.R. REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. 339 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295.
35. This deference "is based as much on policy grounds as on constitutional grounds." H.R.

REP. No. 595, at 339.
36. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994); see also MICHAEL J. HERBERT, PROPERTY INTERESTS IN
BANKRUPTCY § 1.1 (1996); Plank, supra note 22, at 1194.
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reorganization under Chapter 11 for businesses or under Chapter 13 for
most individuals. In a Chapter 7 liquidation, the debtor's non-exempt
assets are liquidated, and proceeds are distributed to creditors. In exchange
for giving up non-exempt assets, most of an individual debtor's debts are
discharged, and the debtor is given a fresh start free from the discharged
debts. 37 In the Chapter 7 liquidation of an entity, there is no discharge, 3 but
the entity typically ceases its operations upon liquidation.39 In a Chapter 7
liquidation, unsecured creditors rarely receive the full amount they are due
and frequently receive nothing.' Secured creditors, on the other hand, are
generally entitled to receive the full amount of their secured claims. The
property securing a claim may be sold by the trustee subject to the security
interest, or it may be sold free and clear of the security interest with
proceeds being distributed to the secured creditor.4 If the bankruptcy estate
has no equity in the property, the trustee may abandon the property to the
secured creditor.42 An individual debtor may redeem certain types of
property by paying the secured creditor an amount equal to the secured
claim.43 In any event, the secured creditor should receive the full value of
the secured claim within a relatively short period of time.
The goal of a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 reorganization is to eventually
confirm a plan of repayment that will provide more to creditors than a
liquidation. Once again, however, unsecured creditors tend to receive a
very small percentage of the amount they are due." In theory, secured
creditors are entitled to receive as much under a reorganization plan as they
would in a Chapter 7 liquidation.45 The primary difference between
liquidation and reorganization for secured creditors is the delay factor.
Particularly in a Chapter 11 filing, a significant period of time can elapse
after the bankruptcy filing and before a plan is confirmed.46 During this

37. See 11 U.S.C. § 727.
38. See id. at § 727(a)(1).
39. See DOUGLAS G. BARD, THE ELEMENTS OFBANKRUYrCY 14 (1992).
40. See James W. Bowers, GropingandCopingin the Shadow ofMurphy'sLaw: Bankruptcy
Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2097, 2098 n.2 (1990);
Michael J. Herbert & Domenic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution
ofAssets in Chapter7 Bankruptcy ProceedingsClosedDuring1984-87,22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303,
311 (1988).
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b), (f).
42. See id. § 554.
43. See id. § 722; see also Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (prohibiting "lien
stripping").
44. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtorin Full Control-Systems FailureUnder Chapter11
of the Bankruptcy Code, Parts 1 & 2,57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 99, 103-26,247-71 (1983).
45. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
46. A Chapter 11 proceeding typically lasts 18 months or more. See Douglas G. Baird, The
Reorganizationof Closely Held Firms and the "Opt Out" Problem, 72 WASH U. L.Q. 913, 916
(1994); Bebchuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case, supranote 2, at 911; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble
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time a secured creditor is stayed from taking any action to collect the debt
or to realize upon collateral. 47 The stay creates a potential for loss to a
secured creditor because the value of collateral can decline over time and
because of lost opportunity cost. These issues are addressed in the
Bankruptcy Code with a concept called "adequate protection."48
Adequate protection gives secured creditors protection against the value
of their security declining during the pendancy of a bankruptcy proceeding.
Another component of loss for the secured creditor during this time is lost
opportunity cost, because the creditor is stayed from foreclosing on the
collateral. During the pendancy of a bankruptcy proceeding, oversecured
creditors, those with claims that are less than the value of their collateral,
are entitled to accrue interest.49 If an adequate equity cushion exists, then
the secured creditor is deemed adequately protected. Otherwise, the
secured creditor may be entitled to periodic payments. Undersecured
creditors, those with claims that exceed the value of their collateral, are not
entitled to lost opportunity cost. 0 Except for lost opportunity cost to
undersecured creditors, the Code, at least in theory, protects secured
creditors' right to the value of their collateral.
The Bankruptcy Code also gives deference to property rights of third
parties other than those of secured creditors. For example, when a landlord
is in bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor in possession has the option to reject
a lease, but the tenant may retain rights of possession and use of the
property for the remainder of the lease term, including any renewal or
extension.51 Therefore, although contractual rights under the lease may be
rejected, a tenant's property rights are preserved.
Another example of deference to property rights under the Bankruptcy
Code is the treatment of co-ownership interests of third parties in property
of the debtor. Property of the estate can be sold free and clear of coownership interests only if partition in kind is impracticable, sale of the
estate's undivided interest would realize substantially less for the estate,

with Chapter11, 1993 WIs. L. REV. 729, 739-45.
47. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
48. Adequate protection may be required in connection with the automatic stay of § 362, the
use, sale or lease or property under § 323, or the court's authorization of ajunior lien under § 364.
11 U.S.C. § 323; 11 U.S.C. § 362; 11 U.S.C. § 364. Adequate protection may be provided by
requiring cash payments to the party, by providing for additional or replacement liens, or by
"granting such other relief ...as will result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable
equivalent of [the property interest]." 11 U.S.C. § 361(3). Although the concept of adequate
protection is applicable to any interest of a third party in property of the estate, it is particularly
applicable with respect to security interests.
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).
50. See infra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii).
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and the benefit to the estate outweighs the detriment to the co-owner. 52
Most courts addressing the constitutionality of this provision have upheld
it against a Fifth Amendment challenge on the basis that the taking is for
a public purpose and compensation is paid to the co-owner.53 Therefore,
the Bankruptcy Code tends to respect the state law rights of property
owners.
B. Proposalsfor Changingthe Treatment
of Secured Creditors
Although current bankruptcy law gives great deference to property
rights of secured creditors, critics of secured credit would reduce or
eliminate the priority of secured creditors in bankruptcy. For example,
Professors Bebchuk and Fried have proposed that secured creditors receive
only 75% of the amount of their secured claims, treating the remainder of
each claim as unsecured and reserving the remaining collateral value for
payment of unsecured claims.54 As an alternative, they proposed that
nonadjusting creditors, those who cannot adjust the size of their claims to
reflect the existence of secured credit, 5 "not be subordinated to secured
claims with respect to which they were nonadjusting. ' 5 6 Other scholars
have proposed giving tort claimants priority over secured creditors in
57

bankruptcy.

Other proposals do not address bankruptcy specifically, but would
change the priority of secured creditors both in and out of bankruptcy.
Professor Leebron has proposed priority for tort claimants over secured
creditors under both bankruptcy and commercial law,5" and Professor
LoPucki has proposed giving other involuntary creditors priority as well.59

52. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h).
53. See Coan v. Bernier (In re Bemier), 176 B.R. 976, 990 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995); In re
Tsunis, 39 B.R. 977, 980 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 733 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1984). But see
Community Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81, 100 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1991). Unfortunately, not all stateand federal schemes similarly respect co-owners' property rights.
See generally Mary B. Spector, Crossing the Threshold: Examining the Abatement of Public
NuisancesWithin the Home, 31 CoNN. L. REV. 547 (1999) (criticizing state nuisance abatement and
federal forfeiture schemes that fail to take into account interests of co-owners).
54. See Bebchuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case, supra note 2, at 908-09.
55. See id. at 882. Nonadjusting creditors include private involuntary creditors such as tort
claimants, governmental entities with tax and regulatory claims, voluntary creditors with claims too
small to warrant adjusting for secured credit, and prior voluntary creditors. See id. at 882-88.
56. Id. at 905.
57. See Rasmussen, supra note 5, at 31-34; Rasmussen & Skeel, supra note 5, at 87.
58. See Leebron, supra note 5, at 1643-49.
59. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 1963. Involuntary creditors would have priority over
unsecured voluntary creditors as well. See id. Tort claimants are the most obvious example of
involuntary creditors, but the category may also include former spouses and children with unpaid
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Professor Warren would permit unsecured creditors to reach 20% of the
value of a debtor's assets.' Unsecured creditors would first be required to
execute on unencumbered assets, but could reach assets subject to security
interests to the extent that unencumbered assets were not available.6"
Professor Warren's proposal would apply only to Article 9 security
interests and only to commercial loans.62
Scholars proposing to modify the treatment of secured creditors have
focused on public policy issues in commercial law and bankruptcy law.
They have for the most part avoided discussing constitutional issues raised
by their proposals.
II. TAKINGS LAW
Takings law has been described as a "muddle."'6 3 Some scholars have
attempted to unmuddle takings law,' while others have acknowledged that
there can be no "coherent master rule" in takings.6 My purpose in this
article is not to reconceptualize takings law but to try to fit the bankruptcy

support claims, governmental agencies, educational lenders, health care providers, taxing
authorities, landlords, and utility companies. Id. at 1896 (citing SuLUVAN ET AL, supra note 33,
at 18, 294).
60. See Warren Memorandum to the ALl, supra note 5,at 1.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57
S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984). See also Daniel L. Mandelker, New Property Rights Under the

Taking Clause,81 MARQ. L. REV. 9,11,16 (1997) (discussing the "segmentation muddle"); Jeremy
Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S.CAL. L. REV. 1393, 1524 (1991) ("chaos" in

takings law); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L. J.1077, 1078 (1993) (takings law is "engulfed
in confusion"). Professors Heller and Krier have described Supreme Court takings decisions since
Pennsylvania Coal as follows:

Supreme Court decisions over the last three-quarters of a century have obscured
and bifurcated the nuisance exception to regulatory takings; have waffled on the
question of conceptual severance; have distinguished inconsistently between
permanent and temporary takings; have suggested that what is not just
compensation actually is just compensation, if only regulators are crafty; have
made little of large losses, unless they are entire, and much of small ones, even
when they are zero; have become confused about what "private property" is for
purposes of the Takings Clause; have, in short, turned the words of the Takings
Clause into a cryptogram that only the Justices in a given case are able to decipher
(and seldom do all of them agree).
Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distributionin the Law of Takings, 112
HARV. L. REV. 997, 1023-24 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
64. See, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 63, at 1024.
65. See Margaret Jane Radin, Diagnosing the Takings Problem, in REINTERPRETING

PROPERTY 146, 165 (1993).
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takings problem into the current legal framework of takings jurisprudence
in the most rational way. In order to evaluate the bankruptcy takings
problem, however, I must elaborate on some of the elements of the existing
formula. I will begin with a discussion of the principal takings cases
handed down by the Supreme Court. Then I will discuss the bankruptcy
takings cases.
A. A Primeron Takings Law
The Fifth Amendment prohibits takings of private property for public
use without just compensation.' Therefore, the Constitution requires that
67
governmental takings of private property be for the benefit of the public
and that just compensation be paid. Until the 1920s, the Takings Clause
was applied only to invalidate the appropriation of property or physical
ouster by government without compensation. 68 Regulation of property was
treated separately under the police power. Courts found that if the
government was acting within the scope of its police power in regulating,
no taking could occur.69 In 1922, Justice Holmes, writing the opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 0 first applied the Takings Clause to
regulation of property, stating, "if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."7' The Court has found that the purpose of the
Takings Clause is "to prevent the government 'from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which,
' 72 in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.'
Since its holding in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court has refined its
jurisprudence on regulatory takings. In Penn Central TransportationCo.
v. New York City,73 the Court enunciated three factors that have particular
significance in determining when a regulatory taking has occurred: (1) "the
character of the governmental action," (2) "[t]he economic impact of the

66. "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S.
CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 238-41 (1897).
67. The Supreme Court has construed the public use requirement broadly as a requirement
of public benefit. See Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
68. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
69. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,394-95 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123
U.S. 623, 623-24 (1887).
70. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
71. Id. at 415. But cf Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our 'Regulatory Takings'
Jurisprudence":The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes' Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 106 YALEL.J. 613 (1996) (arguingthatPennsylvaniaCoal was decided on the basis of the
due process clause rather than the takings clause).
72. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S.Ct. 2131, 2146 (1998) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
73. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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regulation," and (3) the extent to which it interferes with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 74 In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,75 the Court set forth two types of categorical takings that did not
require a court to consider the ad hoe test of Penn Central.76 The two
categorical takings are regulations that compel a physical invasion of
property and regulations that deny an owner all economically beneficial use
of property.77 However, an exception exists where denial of all
economically beneficial use comes from a limitation that "background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon
land ownership. 78 Thus, the Takings Clause does not require
compensation if the limitation is a part of the owner's title.7 9
The Supreme Court has also held that a taking will occur if land use
regulation "does not substantially advance [a] legitimate [governmental]
interest[]. 80 In Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission, l and Dolanv.
City of Tigard,8" the Court made clear that at least in the context of
exactions, this test is an intermediate level scrutiny test. Commentators
have discussed whether the substantial relationship requirement comes
from the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause 3 and whether the
heightened scrutiny is applicable in all takings cases or only in exactions
cases.' These issues are not relevant in this Article because I will assume
that bankruptcy legislation enacted pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause
would meet either test.85
In applying the takings formula, a court must first determine if there is
a protected property interest at stake.86 If so, the court then determines

74. Id. at 124; see Eastern, 118 S. Ct. at 2146; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,714 (1987)
(citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
75. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
76. See id. at 1015.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 1029.
79. See id. at 1030.
80. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016.
81. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
82. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
83. See LawrenceBerger, PublicUse, SubstantiveDueProcessandTakings-AnIntegration,
74 NEB. L. REV. 843, 862-71 (1995); Thomas E. Roberts et al., Land-Use Litigation: Doctrinal
Confusion Under the Fifth and FourteenthAmendments, 28 URB. LAW. 765, 766 (1996).
84. See Berger,supranote 83, at 869; MatthewJ. Cholewa&HelenL. Edmonds, Federalism
andLand Use After Dolan: Has the Supreme Court Taken Takingsfrom the States?,28 URB. LAW.
401,419-23 (1996).
85. See infra note 145.
86. See, e.g., Phillips v. Washington LegalFound., 118 S.Ct. 1925,1928 (1998); M & JCoal
Co. v. United States, 47 F.3d 1148, 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see also LAITOS, supra note 22, at 111-3
('The threshold question should therefore not be whether the government has in some way violated
the Constitution, but whether the government action has affected an interest that is recognized as
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whether a categorical taking under Lucas exists. Finally, if there is no
categorical taking, the court must apply the ad hoc test that originated in
Penn Central.Essentially, the court must.determine whether "'justice and
fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action [must] be
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately
concentrated on a few persons.... ."" This determination is "ad hoc and
fact intensive" and requires a court to consider the Penn Centralfactors as
being particularly significant.8" A finding of a taking is less likely when
interference with property rights "arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."89 However, economic regulation "may nonetheless effect
a taking."' Therefore, bankruptcy legislation, which transfers value from
one party to another can raise the takings issue. 9'
B. The Bankruptcy Takings Cases
The Supreme Court has addressed the takings issue in the context of
bankruptcy on several occasions, holding each time that the bankruptcy
power is limited by the Takings Clause.92 However, the Supreme Court
squarely addressed the bankruptcy takings issue only within the limited
framework of an act that retroactively impaired the rights of secured
creditors 93 and a railroad reorganization case.9 4 In a more recent case, the
Court discussed the bankruptcy takings issue but did not reach the issue in
its holding.95
In Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,' the Supreme Court
addressed the constitutionality of the Frazier-Lemke Act,9 which gave
bankrupt farmers the right, with mortgagee consent, to purchase the

property.").
87. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131,2146 (1998) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted in original).
88. Id. (citing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 175).
89. Id. (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
90. Id. (citing United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,75 (1982)).
91. See Security Indus., 459 U.S. at 78.
92. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,75,78 (1982); Wright v. Vinton
Branch of Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440,456-58 (1937); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank
v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555,589 (1935); see also Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island, & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 669 (1935) (stating that the bankruptcy power is not
unlimited); Holt v. Henley 232 U.S. 637, 639 (1914) (holding that an amendment to bankruptcy
law must be applied prospectively to avoid affecting existing property rights).
93. See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
95. See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
96. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
97. Pub. L. No. 73-486,48 Stat. 1289 (1934).
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mortgaged property at its appraised value on a payment plan with deferred
payments bearing interest at the rate of one percent per annum.9 8 If the
mortgagee refused to consent to the debtor's purchase of the property, the
debtor was given a stay of foreclosure proceedings for five years.99 During
the five year period, the debtor was permitted to retain possession of the
property, paying a reasonable annual rent, and was entitled at any time
during the five year period to purchase the property for its appraised or
reappraised value."° The Act applied only to debts existing at the time of
its enactment'"' because members of Congress felt that application of the
bill to future mortgages would make it impossible for farmers to borrow
money.1m
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the Frazier-Lemke Act
violated the Fifth Amendment by taking property rights without just
compensation.l0 3 The Court found that the mortgagee had specific property
rights under state law including the mortgagee's right to retain its lien until
the debt was paid in full, the right to realize upon its security by judicial
foreclosure sale, the right to determine when a foreclosure sale would be
held, the right to bid its sale, and the right to control the property during
period of default while receiving rents and profits.'" The Court held that
the act violated the Fifth Amendment by taking those rights without just
compensation. 0 5
After the original Frazier-Lemke Act was declared unconstitutional,
Congress amended the Act.' 6 The new Frazier-Lemke Act provided for
only a three-year stay, rather than the five-year stay provided in the original
act, and contained other changes as well. 7 The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the new act in Wright v. Vinton Branch of Mountain
Trust Bank, finding that the three-year stay was not absolute, but could be
terminated by a court.'0 8 In addition, the Court found that the mortgagee
retained the right to a judicial foreclosure sale under certain
circumstances.'" Therefore, the Court concluded that many of the property

98. See § 75,48 Stat. at 1291.
99. See § 75(s)(7), 48 Stat. at 1291.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 2063, at 1 (1934); 78 Cong. Rec. 12,074 (statement of Senator
Bankhead); 78 Cong. Rec. 12,075 (1934) (statement of Senator Fess); 78 Cong. Rec. 12,137
(statement of Representative Peyser).
103. See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02 (1935).

104. See id. at 594-95.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See id. at 588-90.
See Act of Aug. 28, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-384, 49 Stat. 941,942 (1935).
See id. § 75(s)(2), 49 Stat. at 944.
300 U.S. 440,460-61 (1937).
See id. at 458-59.
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rights of the mortgagee were preserved by the new act" ° and that the act
modified only the mortgagee's remedial rights. 11 Subsequent cases
overruled these interpretations of the new Frazier-Lemke Act. In John
HancockMutual Life InsuranceCo. v. Bartels' 2 the Supreme Court held
that the new act did not provide for dismissal based on lack of a reasonable
probability of rehabilitation. 3 In Wright v. Union CentralLife Insurance
Co.,"' a case involving the same debtor as the Vinton Branch case, the
Court held that the debtor must be permitted to redeem the property at the
appraised or reappraised value before the court could order a judicial
foreclosure sale."'
While the subsequent cases call into question some details of the
holding in Radford, they do not call into question the principle that the
bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment. These subsequent
cases simply reassess the relationship between contractual rights and
property rights created by a mortgage. Both John Hancock and Union
Central define as the secured creditor's essential property interest the
assurance that the value of the mortgaged property will be devoted to the
payment of the secured creditor's claim. 11 6 One possible distinction
between the old Frazier-Lemke Act and the new act that could explain
these cases is the length of the stay. Under the original act the stay was five
years, and under the new act it was only three. Professor Rogers dismisses
this distinction as irrational, arguing that Radford had been overruled." 7
However, recent cases in the courts of appeals of two circuits have focused
on the length of delay imposed
on a secured creditor as an important and
8
distinguishing factor. 1
In 1970, the Supreme Court again discussed the application of the
Takings Clause to bankruptcy law in the New Haven Inclusion Cases." 9
Secured bondholders of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
argued that a reorganization plan transferring assets of the New Haven
Railroad to Penn Central constituted a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment because the price Penn Central was to pay for the assets was

110. See id. at 458.
Ill. See id. at 470.
112. 308 U.S. 180 (1939).
113. See id. at 184.
114. 311 U.S. 273 (1940).
115. See id. at 279.
116. See 311 U.S. at 278-79; 308 U.S. at 186-87.
117. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 981-84.
118. See Simon v. Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17, 23-24 (3d Cir. 1995); Donnalndep. Sch. Dist. v. Balli,
21 F.3d 100, 101 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215,223 (5th Cir. 1994). See
infra notes 213-29 and accompanying text.
119. 399 U.S. 392 (1970).
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insufficient."2 The Court held that the bondholders were entitled to the full
liquidation value of the assets "by virtue of their mortgage liens ' 12 even
though the liquidation value exceeded the going concern value of the
railroad." However, the bondholders were not entitled to be compensated
for their loss due to the delay caused by the reorganization. 123 The Court
stressed that the bondholders had "invested their capital in a public utility
that does owe an obligation to the public .... [They] assumed the risk that
in any depression or any reorganization the interests of the public would
be considered as well as theirs."" Therefore, the Court protected the right
of the bondholders to have the value of their collateral applied to the
payment of the secured debt, but permitted losses caused by a substantial
delay.
The Supreme Court more recently confirmed its continued support for
the proposition that bankruptcy law is subject to the Takings Clause in
United States v. Security IndustrialBank. 2 The Security Industrialcase
involved the interpretation of section 522 (f)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code
which permits individuals in bankruptcy to avoid non-possessory, nonpurchase money liens on household furnishings, appliances and certain
other types of exempt property. 26 The issue in the case was whether this
provision was applicable to secured parties who had obtained and perfected
their liens on a debtor's household furnishings and appliances before the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.127 The majority said that the provision,
if applied retroactively, "would result in a complete destruction of the
property right of the secured party[.] ' 12 The Court distinguished the case
from regulatory takings cases "where governmental action affected some
but not all of the 'bundle of rights' which comprise the 'property' in
question."' 129 The fact that the property interest of a secured creditor is
smaller than that of a fee simple owner is irrelevant.130 Although the Court
declined to reach the constitutional question of whether the retroactive

120. See id. at 400-12.

121. Id. at 489-90.
122. See id. at 494.
123. See id. at 490-91.

124. Id. at 491-92 (quoting Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 328
U.S. 495, 535-536 (1946)). See generally J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,

11-12 (1997) (arguing that
deregulation of a public utility can effect a taking because of investment-backed expectations in the
regulatory contract).
125. 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2) (1988).
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT'

127.
128.
129.
130.

See Security Indus., 459 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 75.
Id.
See id.
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application of the provision would constitute a taking, the Court held that
a retroactive application of the provision would raise "substantial enough
Court held that the provision
Therefore,
constitutional doubts....
132the
only.
effect
prospective
given
be
must
The Supreme Court has not addressed the bankruptcy takings issue
since Security Industrial. Security Industrial, while instructive on the
bankruptcy takings issue, was actually a case of statutory construction.
Therefore, the Court squarely addressed the issue only in the context of the
Frazier-Lemke Act, a purely retroactive statute, and a railroad
reorganization. 133 Lower courts continue to decide bankruptcy cases
involving takings issues, but they differ on how to approach the bankruptcy
takings problem.13 4 As a result, it is necessary to look to non-bankruptcy
takings law to answer most of the questions arising today about takings in
bankruptcy.
II. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE

BANKRUPTCY TAKINGS PROBLEM

Soon after the Supreme Court issued its holding in Security Industrial,
Professor Rogers considered the case in his article. He concluded that the
Takings Clause imposes no limitation on the power of Congress to enact
purely prospective legislation impairing security interests, and he criticized
the Court's application of the Takings Clause to retroactive legislation. 3 '
Since its holding in Security Industrial,the Supreme Court has decided a
number of significant takings cases outside the bankruptcy arena. 36 The
Court has made significant changes to takings law during this time period
and has adopted an approach to defining the scope of property rights that

131. Id. at74.
132. See id. at 82.
133. See id. at 70.
134. Compare Patriot Portfolio, LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 164 F.3d 677, 686 (1st
Cir. 1999) and Bruin Portfolio, LLC v. Leicht (In re Leicht), 222 B.R. 670 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1998)
(following Rogers' approach) with United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs. (In re
Timbers oflnwood Forest Assocs.), 793 F.2d 1380,1390, 1390 n.14 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd484U.S.
365 (1988) (rejecting Rogers' approach).
135. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 1031.
136. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2153 (1998); see, e.g., Phillips v.
Washington Legal Found., 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725 (1997); Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374
(1994); Concrete Pipe & Prods., Inc. v. Construction Laborers PensionTrust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993);
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503
U.S. 519 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis,480 U.S. 470 (1987); Connolly
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984).
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differs from Professor Rogers' approach.137 Nevertheless, courts have
continued to rely on Professor Rogers' reasoning, and scholars proposing
changes to the treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy have assumed
the constitutionality of their proposals based on Professor Rogers'
conclusions, failing to consider fallacies in his arguments or recent changes
in takings jurisprudence.138
Some of Professor Rogers' conclusions were incorrect. Others were
normative and should, therefore, not be the basis for assumptions about the
constitutionality of proposals. Finally, some of his reasoning has been
rejected by the Supreme Court in cases that it decided since he published
his article. In this section, I will address the validity of Professor Rogers'
conclusions as well as other underlying assumptions that courts or scholars
have relied upon in assessing the constitutionality of current law and of
proposals for changing the treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy.
A. FaultyAssumption #1: The Takings ClauseImposes No
SignificantLimitation on the Bankruptcy Power
In his article, Professor Rogers concluded:
Justice Brandeis' famous statement in the Radford case that
"[t]he bankruptcy power . . . is subject to the Fifth
Amendment," . . . is in fact false. The only significant
constitutional restraint on the substance of purely prospective
bankruptcy legislation is the bankruptcy clause itself. Even in
the context of retroactive application of bankruptcy
legislation, the effort to deduce controlling principles from
general principles about property rights.., proves far less
successful than an approach that draws more heavily on
bankruptcy principles... 139
Therefore, Professor Rogers would look only to the Bankruptcy Clause in
determining the constitutionality of bankruptcy legislation. Some courts
have adopted his reasoning.140

137. See infra Part III.C. Even before his article, the Court had rejected his assertion that the
rights of secured creditors are no different from the rights of unsecured creditors. See infra notes
172-74 and accompanying text.
138. See Bebchuk & Fried, The'Uneasy Case,supra note 2, at 932; LoPucki, supra note 1, at
1952-54; see also Knippenberg, supra note 16 at 1974 (citing Professor Rogers in support of

Professor LoPucki's proposal).
139. Rogers, supra note 6, at 1031 (footnotes omitted).
140. Courts have quoted Professor Rogers as follows:

mhe famous statement that the bankruptcy power is subject to the fifth
amendment must be taken to mean nothing more than that the fifth amendment,
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Professor Rogers' conclusion is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the relationship between the two clauses as well as with
established understandings of Constitutional interpretation. The Supreme
Court has addressed the limitations imposed by the Takings Clause upon
retroactive bankruptcy legislation. 41 Although the Court has not addressed
the takings issue with respect to prospective bankruptcy legislation, the
Court has never indicated that the Takings Clause becomes irrelevant in
such a case. Courts and scholars interpreting potentially conflicting
constitutional provisions should read them in a way to give effect to
both. 42 The Bankruptcy Clause and the Takings Clause can be read
together in a logical way that does give effect to both.
In order to comply with the Fifth Amendment, regulations must
advance legitimate governmental interests. 43 Whether this requirement
comes from the Due Process Clause or the Takings Clause and whether the
level of scrutiny is heightened or not in a case not involving exactions is
not important in this analysis. 1" This prong of the takings formula is the
one that considers whether Congress is acting within the scope of the
bankruptcy power, but the remainder of the takings formula cannot be
ignored. This is the flaw in Professor Rogers' reasoning that the
bankruptcy power is not limited by the Fifth Amendment. While the power
of Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation is relevant in the takings
analysis, 45 it does not end the inquiry. Other factors must be considered in
determining if bankruptcy legislation is a taking of property without just

through either the due process clause or the takings clause, is the constitutional
foundation for the proposition that statutes that retroactively disrupt settled
expectations may be subject to particularly attentive judicial scrutiny.
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Burlington, 878 F.2d 354, 359 n.6 (1989) (quoting Rogers, supra note 6, at
985); see Yi v. Citibank, 219 B.R. 394,402 (E.D. Va. 1998).
141. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
142. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION 20-23

(1991). Professors Tribe and Dorf say that the Constitution should not be read by "dis-integration,"
which they define as "approaching the Constitution in ways that ignore the salient fact that its parts
are linked into a whole-that it is a Constitution, and not merely an unconnected bunch of separate
clauses and provisions with separate histories, that must be interpreted." Id. at 20. They continue:

"It is a dis-integrated 'reading' of the Constitution to lift one provision out, hold it up to the light,
and give it its broadest possible interpretation, while ignoring the fact that it is immersed in a larger

whole." Id. at 22.
143. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.

145. For purposes of this Article, I will assume a substantial relationship exists and will
continue with the remainder of the analysis required by recent Supreme Courtcases. Any legislation
that is within the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause would be rationally related to the bankruptcy

power. Whether the legislation was substantially related would depend upon the particular
legislation.
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compensation.
B. FaultyAssumption #2: A Security Interest
Is Not an Interest in Property
Bankruptcy limitations on secured creditors raise the takings issue only
if secured creditors have property rights.'4 6 If security interests are only
contract rights, then they can be impaired in the same manner as unsecured
debts in bankruptcy. Although contract rights have been treated as property
for some purposes, 47 governmental interference with contract rights has
not been treated as a taking.14 Contract rights can be impaired in
bankruptcy because the Contracts Clause of the Constitution applies only
to the states, not to the federal government. 49 If security interests are
property rights, then the Takings Clause, rather than the Contracts Clause,
is at issue.
Several scholars involved in the secured credit debate have discussed
the issue of whether a security interest constitutes a property interest. A
number of scholars take the view that a security interest is a property
interest. 50 Some, while acknowledging that a security interest is currently
treated as a property interest, take the normative view that it should not be
so treated.' Others scholars refuse to acknowledge that a security interest

146. The threshold question in determining if there has been a taking is whether the affected
interest is recognized as property. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
147. Contract rights are property rights for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See Lynch v.
United States, 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1878). An
unsecured claim also is property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See Tulsa Professional
Collection Services v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988).
148. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,75 (1982). But see RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 88 (1985)
("[C]ontract rights created by a voluntary exchange are protected by the eminent domain clause.").
Professor Laitos theorizes that "a contract would not be property under the Takings Clause when
nullified by Congress acting within its powers, and when that congressional action had taken
nothing for its own use." LAITOS, supra note 22, § 5.02[A].
149. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 680 (1935).
150. See, e.g., Baird, Security Interests Reconsidered,supra note 2, at 2257; Bowers, supra
note 2, at 59 n.85 ('The Bankruptcy Code does not accord a priority to secured lenders. It simply
refuses to distribute other people's property to the creditors of the debtor but instead distributes
property to those who own it."); Harris & Mooney, A Property-BasedTheory, supra note 2, at
2051. Professors Harris and Mooney base their argument in support of secured credit on the
assumption that a security interest is an interest in property. Id. at 2051-53.
151. This is the approach of Professors Ponoroff and Knippenberg, who believe that a security
interest should be reconceptualized in bankruptcy, not as a right in property, but as a claim to
property up to the value of the collateral at the time of filing. See Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen
Knippenberg, The Immovable Object Versus the IrresistibleForce: Rethinking the Relationship
Between Secured Creditand Bankruptcy Policy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2234, 2290-94 (1997). Their
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is an interest in property or avoid the issue altogether.152 Professor Rogers
argues that a secured creditor does not acquire property rights which
should be accorded greater protection than the contract rights of an
unsecured creditor.' 5' Thus, although many scholars may take the
normative view that a security interest should not be treated as a property
interest, few scholars are willing to say that a security interest is not an
interest in property. 5 4 With the law as it stands, those scholars who refuse
to admit that a security interest is property are letting their normative view
influence their conclusions.
Property rights are not defined by the Constitution, but rather "by
reference to 'existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law."'155 Bankruptcy law also does not
generally define property rights but rather defers to state law.'56 Clearly

article focuses on the nature of a security interest as property in the context of Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410 (1992). Ponoroff and Knippenberg consider experiential realism, which focuses on
the role of metaphor in human conceptual systems. The experientialist would view legal concepts
as "metaphoric constructs that enable meaning in accordance with... goals and purposes, rather
than abstractions of things the way they really are." Id. at 2283. Under this theory, property, in
reality a physical thing, is just a metaphor with respect to a security interest. The property metaphor
is useful in defining security, and in dealing with state law issues relating thereto, but is not so
useful in the context of bankruptcy. See id. at 2285, 2291. They argue that the treatment of a
security interest as a property right in bankruptcy can be abandoned because it is only a metaphor,
not reality. See id. at 2269-70; see also Knippenberg, supra note 16, at 1975 (describing the
conveyance model of a security interest as a metaphor). However, the treatment of any intangible
property right as "property" is in a sense a metaphor. See Plank, supra note 22, at 1200-07
(discussing the difference between the use of the term property in its colloquial sense to mean "the
thing" and the use of the term in its more technical sense to mean an interest in property).
152. Professor LoPucki eschews the property based theory, although he does not come right
out and say that a security interest is not an interest in property. LoPucki, supranote 1, at 1952-53.
Professors Warren and LoPucki carefully avoid calling a security interest an interest in property in
theirtextbook on secured credit, defining alien as "the relationship between particular property (the
collateral)and a particular debt or obligation." LYNNL. LoPucIa&ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 24 (2d ed. 1998) (emphasis in original). Professors Bebchuk and
Fried refuse to address the issue, saying that a security interest gives a secured creditor a
"repossessory right" and a "priority right" in order to stay clear of the property issue. See Bebchuk
& Fried, The Uneasy Case, supra note 2, at 860, n.8.
153. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 988-94; see also Klee, supra note 2, at 1476-77 (stating that
a "lien might be regarded as a contract right or interest in property, rather than property itself.").
154. But see Steve H. Nickles, CommercialLaw Consequences of the Bankruptcy System:
Urging the Mergerof the Article 9 Drafting Committee and the Bankruptcy Commission, 69 AM.
BANKR.L.J.589, 593 (1995) (stating that"Mhere are rumors ofsomedeveloping academic support
for the notion that liens are not property.").
155. Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 118 S.Ct. 1925, 1930 (1998) (quoting Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972)); see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984); Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290,295 (1967).
156. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324, 329 (1993); Bamhill v. Johnson,
503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-55 (1979). In Butner, the
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under existing state law, both Article 9 security interests and consensual
liens in real property are interests in property.' 57 Mortgages and deeds of
trust convey an interest in real property.'58 Some states treat the
mortgagee's interest as title, while others treat the interest as a lien,
depending upon whether the mortgagee has a technical right to take
possession of the property.'59 Even lien theory states, however, recognize
that the mortgagee's interest is an interest in real property.' 60 Security
interests in personal property are similarly treated as property interests
under state law.' 6 ' The Bankruptcy Code definition of a lien includes an
interest in property.162 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that
a security interest is an interest in property. 63 The law does treat and
historically has treated the interest of a secured creditor in either real or
personal property as an interest in the property. While this treatment may
simply be an accident of history,164 history did treat the security interest as
an interest in property.' 65

Supreme Court said, "Congress has generally left the determination of property rights in the assets
of a bankrupt's estate to state law." 440 U.S. at 54.
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997) ("A mortgage is a
conveyance or retention of an interest in real property as security for performance of an
obligation."); U.C.C. § 1-201(37) ("'Security interest' means an interest in personal
property -... ").
158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFPROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 (1997).
159. Under modem American law, only a few states retain the "title" model of the mortgage,
under which the mortgagee is theoretically entitled to possession of the property upon execution
of the mortgage. See 1GRANT S. NELSON & GALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 4.1
(3d ed. 1994). In fact, modem mortgagees rarely take possession of mortgaged property even in
those states in which they are entitled to do so. See id. Otherjurisdictions, called "intermediate" or
"lien theory" states permit a mortgagee to take possession of mortgaged property only upon default
or only upon foreclosure. See id. §§ 4.2-.3. In fact, all of this makes little difference except on the
issue of pr-foreclosure remedies. See id. §§ 4.1-.3. Regardless of whether a jurisdiction is
classified as lien theory, title theory or intermediate, the mortgagee has what is commonly referred
to as a lien, which is a property interest, although in almost all instances, a non-possessory interest.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 cmt. (1997).
160. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFPROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 1.1 cmt.(1997).
161. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (1994) (stating 'lien' means charge against or interest in
property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation").
163. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,76 (1982); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 46 (1962); see also Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S.
555, 588 (1935) (explaining that secured creditors have rights in specific property).
164. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 994.
165. The mortgage of 14th century England, a forebearer of the American mortgage, was a
conveyance of a fee simple from the borrower to the lender, subject to a condition subsequent. See
NELSON &WHITMAN, supranote 159, § 1.2; Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problemsin Possession,
Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11 DEPAULL. REV. 1, 1 (1961). The conveyance gave the lender
all incidents of legal title, including the right to take possession of the property. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra,§ 1.2. Early mortgage lenders actually took possession of property and collected
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Just what is the nature of a security interest in the bundle of property
rights? A security interest in real property is created by grant to the
mortgagee or to a trustee. The interest granted is generally non-possessory,
but with the right of the lender in many states to take possession upon
default.) 66 The interest terminates upon payment in full of the debt,
although the lender (or trustee) is typically required to execute a release of
the mortgage. During the term of the mortgage, the lender is protected by
common law concepts of waste. The interest includes a right to a
foreclosure that cuts off any rights of the borrower, eitherjudicially or nonjudicially, resulting in nothing more than payment of net sale proceeds up
to the amount of the debt to the lender. As a matter of fact, the lender is
almost always the successful bidder at a foreclosure sale; however, except
in a few states, where strict foreclosure is allowed under certain
circumstances, 167 there is no right in the lender to ultimately own the
property except by being the successful bidder at a foreclosure sale.
An Article 9 security interest is created by a security agreement. 168 The
secured party is not required to, but may, take possession of the collateral.
The secured party is entitled to take possession upon default in the absence
of an agreement to the contrary. 169 Strict foreclosure is permitted only if the
debtor does not object. 7 0 Otherwise, the secured party usually forecloses
7
by conducting a commercially reasonable sale of the collateral.' '
What then is the property right of a secured creditor? The Supreme
Court has held that it is the right to have the value of the collateral applied

rents and profits from the property as a form of interest at a time when interest was forbade by law.
See id. If the borrower repaid the debt on the required day, the borrower could reenter the property
and terminate the lender's interest, but if the borrower failed to perform as required, the lender's
estate would become absolute. See id. Later, equity courts intervened to create a process of strict
foreclosure, which was required in order to cut off the borrower's equity of redemption, or right to
repay the debt and get the property back. See id. § 1.3. The personal property security interest,
although having a different historical background, was similarly treated as creating a property
interest in the secured creditor. See Harris & Mooney, A Property-BasedTheory, supra note 2, at
2051.
166. The lender has the right to take possession upon default in title theory states, in
intermediate states, and by agreement in many lien theory states. See NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra
note 159, §§ 4.1-.3.
167. See id. § 7.10.
168. See U.C.C. § 9-203. The agreement must be in writing unless the secured party has taken
possession of the collateral. See id. § 9-203(1)(a). In addition, value must be given, and the debtor
must have rights in the collateral. See id. § 9-203(l)(b)-(c).
169. See U.C.C. § 9-503.
170. See U.C.C. § 9-505(b).
171. See U.C.C. § 9-504. Other remedies include foreclosure with real property, § 9-501(4),
judicial sale, § 9-501(5), or collection of funds from an account debtor, § 9-502. See id.
§§ 9-501(4), 9-501(5), 9-502.
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to payment of the secured creditor's claim.' The remainder of a secured
creditor's rights are contract rights. 7 3 The Supreme Court has stated that
"'our cases recognize, as did the common law, that the contractual right of
a secured creditor to obtain repayment of his debt may be quite different
in legal contemplation from the property right of the same creditor in the
collateral." 74 Professor Rogers may take the normative view that the rights
of a secured creditor should be treated no differently from those of an
unsecured creditor, but the Supreme Court has taken a different view.175
The fact that specific property is identified for payment of a secured claim
does make a security interest different from the rights of an unsecured
creditor. Because Professor Rogers' view is normative, it should not be the
basis for assumptions about the constitutionality of proposals for change
in bankruptcy law.
Scholars may argue that property rights should not be given the
deference that they are accorded in bankruptcy or that property rights of
secured creditors should not be treated differently from contractual rights
of unsecured creditors as a matter of distributive justice.176 Ultimately,
while arguments about whether a security interest should be an interest in
property are interesting and valuable, they do not reflect the current state
of the law. These normative views should not be used as the basis for
assumptions about the constitutionality of proposed changes to bankruptcy
law.

172. See Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1940); John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bartels, 308 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1939).
173. With respect to real property, a mortgage or deed of trust is frequently a very extensive
contractual agreement between borrower and lender, imposing numerous obligations upon the
borrower that are more or less related to the land. In fact, the modem mortgage or deed of trust may
best be described as having the dual nature of conveyance and contract, similar to a lease. A
security agreement also has numerous contractual provisions in addition to the grant of the security
interest.
174. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,75 (1982).
175. See id.
176. It is one matter to propose changes to bankruptcy law on the basis of what the law should
be. It is quite another to assert that a security interest should not be treated as an interest in property.
I do not mean to imply that legal scholarship should not venture into this realm. It certainly should.
However, a change to a federal bankruptcy statute is a realistic possibility that could occur in an
upcoming session of Congress. Changes in the common law understanding of a security interest as
property are not so easy. The treatment of a real property security interest as a property interest is
based on common law, which varies greatly from state to state. It is unlikely to change anytime
soon. In addition, state legislatures have been unwilling to pass uniform legislation in the area of
real property security. Even in the area of personal property, a recent revision of Article 9 did not
incorporate such a change. Although property rights can be created by federal law, the federal
government cannot define away property rights created under state law. See infra subpart C.
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C. FaultyAssumption #3: New Bankruptcy
LegislationRedefines the Property
Interest of a Secured Creditor
Professor Rogers assumed that the property rights of secured creditors
are redefined by changes in bankruptcy law. Therefore, because security
interests are defined to include any new limitations imposed on them, no
taking can occur because of newly imposed limitations so long as they are
prospective.'77 Some courts and scholars have adopted his reasoning in
discussing the constitutionality of current and proposed bankruptcy law. 178
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected Professor Rogers' approach
to defining the property rights of secured creditors. In determining the
extent of the property interest at issue, the Court looks to "background
principles" of property law, a phrase that originated in Lucas v. South
CarolinaCoastalCouncil.7 9 In Lucas, the Court found an exception to its
categorical taking rule requiring compensation if the state denies all
economically beneficial use of land where "the proscribed use interests
were not part of [the owner's] title to begin with."'' 0 In defining the
preexisting limitations upon the owner's title, the Court looked to
"background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance.'' In
discussing background principles,
the Court excluded "newly legislated or
82
decreed" limitations on title.1
The Court's exception for preexisting limitations on title has generated
a substantial amount of commentary. Scholars have struggled to determine
what law can be considered background principles.8 3 Scholars have
questioned whether background principles must come from state common
law or whether state or federal legislation could also be included in
background principles.' Some scholars have argued that there is no
logical reason to exclude federal or state legislation."5 Even assuming,
however, that federal legislation such as the Bankruptcy Code could

177. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 987 n.59.
178. See Patriot Portfolio, LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 164 F.3d 677, 686 (1st Cir.
1999) ("Because Patriot's property rights in the lien are circumscribed by the debtor's ability under
the Code to avoid the lien, prospective application of § 522(f) does not constitute a 'taking' of
Patriot's property interest.... ."); Carlson, supra note 15, at 585.
179. 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
180. Id. at 1027.
181. Id. at 1029. Although the exception has been called a"nuisance exception," the Court did
not limit it to nuisance law but included background principles of property law. Id.
182. Id.
183. See Lynn E. Blais, Takings, Statutes, and the Common Law: Considering Inherent
Limitationson Title, 70 S. CAL L. REV. 1, 5 (1996); Fred P. Bosselman, LimitationsInherent in
the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247,328-29 (1996).
184. See Blais, supra note 183, at 1; Bosselman, supra note 183, at 328-29.
185. See Blais, supra note 183 at 49-51.
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constitute background principles, it seems that recent enactments cannot.
The Supreme Court recently elaborated on its understanding of
background principles in Phillipsv. WashingtonLegalFoundation. ' The
Phillipscase involved a challenge to the Texas Interest on Lawyer's Trust
Account (IOLTA) program, which requires that interest from most client
trust funds be paid to a foundation to be used to provide legal services for
low income persons.1 7 The only issue addressed in the case was whether
the interest income generated by IOLTA accounts was private property
under the Takings Clause. l8 The Court looked to "background principles
of property law" in determining that the right to interest was a property
right, but did not consider the IOLTA statute itself as one of the
background principles defining the property interest. 9 The petitioners had
argued that a client could have no expectation of interest on trust fund
accounts and, therefore, no property 'interest.' 9° The Supreme Court
disagreed, stating "'a State by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation' simply by
legislatively abrogating the traditional rule .... ."' Presumably Congress
also may not redefine traditional property interests in order to avoid a
takings problem. Therefore, new bankruptcy legislation would not redefine
the property rights of secured creditors.
D. FaultyAssumption #4: Secured CreditorsAre the Only
PartiesAffected by Changes to the Treatment of
Security Interests in Bankruptcy
Professor Rogers failed to consider the impact of prospective changes
in the treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy on property owners'
ability to create security interests. In discussing his view of prospective
legislation, he stated:
As soon as the government announced that a certain use of
land would henceforth be prohibited or that certain land might
be taken without compensation at some time in the future, the
value of the affected land would be diminished, to the
detriment of its current owner. There can be no new land;
there can, however, be new security arrangements.1 92

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).
See id. at 1927-28.
See id. at 1926.
See id. at 1930-32.
See id. at 1931.
Id.(quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharm. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980)).
Rogers, supra note 6, at 987 n.59.
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He failed to recognize that property owners would be affected by the
inability to convey security interests that could survive bankruptcy. The
Supreme Court has recognized that a taking of certain strands in a property
owners bundle of rights can be a taking without just compensation under
the Fifth Amendment.' 93 For example, the right to exclude others from
property and the right to transfer property by descent or devise are such
essential rights in the bundle."' Therefore, the rights of property owners
as well as secured parties must be considered in addressing the
constitutionality of proposed changes to the treatment of security interests
in bankruptcy. 95
E. FaultyAssumption #5: If CurrentLimitations on the
Rights of Secured CreditorsAre Constitutional,
Additional Limitations Must Be Also
Finally, some scholars have assumed that because current law imposes
limitations on the rights of secured creditors and permits the avoidance of
liens in certain circumstances, additional limitations would not create a
takings problem."9 However, this assumption is not correct. In determining
whether a taking has occurred, courts must apply an ad hoc test which is
fact intensive. 97 Concluding that one type of limitation on the property
rights of secured parties in bankruptcy creates no takings problem does not
require the conclusion that other limitations are also acceptable.
IV. APPLICATION OF TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE TO
EXISTING AND PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY LAW

Despite the fallacy of Professor Rogers' conclusions, either initially or
as a result of changes in takings jurisprudence, courts and scholars have
continued to rely upon them. Therefore, the application of takings doctrine
to bankruptcy law must be reconsidered. In this section of the Article, I
will conduct an analysis of current and proposed bankruptcy law using
takings doctrine as it has developed over the past fifteen years. I will first
consider current bankruptcy law, with a particular emphasis on the problem
of delay and on lien avoidance provisions. Next, I will explore the
193. See infraPart IV.B.1.
194. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715-16 (1987); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444
U.S. 164, 176 (1979). These cases are discussed in Part IV.B.1.
195. At least some scholars involved in the secured credit debate have considered the rights
of property owners in their discussions of takings issues. See Bebchuk & Fried, FurtherThoughts,
supra note 2, at 1290; Klee, supra note 2, at 1476.
196. See Bebchuk & Fried, FurtherThoughts, supranote 2, at 1291 ("[Ihis would imply that
fraudulent conveyance law, preference law, and the rule of mandatory pro rata sharing all violate
the borrower's property rights."). Professor Rogers did not make this argument.
197. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
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assumption of Professor Rogers and other scholars that security interests
could be completely invalidated in bankruptcy without running afoul of the
Takings Clause. Finally, I will consider a partial priority rule such as the
one proposed by Professors Bebchuk and Fried.
A. CurrentBankruptcy Law
1. The Problem of Delay
Current bankruptcy law gives great deference to the interests of secured
creditors.1 98 Unless their liens are avoided, secured creditors are ultimately
entitled to the full amount of their secured claims. The only impairment
of secured claims under current law is caused by the delay between the
filing of bankruptcy, which stays state law collection actions, and the
secured creditor's actual receipt of payment pursuant to a liquidation or a
plan of reorganization. In the case of a Chapter 7 liquidation, the delay
tends to be insignificant. In the case of a reorganization, the delay can be
significant. The Bankruptcy Code provides for a period of 180 days during
which the debtor has the exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization.199
The period of exclusivity is frequently extended so that the plan is not
actually confirmed for many months or even years in some cases.' ° During
the period prior to confirmation of a plan, an oversecured creditor is
entitled to accruing interest as a part of the secured claim. 20 1 Undersecured
creditors, however, are not entitled to interest on their claims to
compensate for delay in bankruptcy. 202 Even undersecured creditors may
be entitled to receive rents from income-producing real property to the
extent that rents exceed expenses of the property.
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code made in 1994 helped the position
of certain real property secured creditors. First, special provisions were
added for single asset real estate cases. Although single asset real estate
cases were defined narrowly to include only cases involving no more than
$4 million of secured debt,2°3 delays in these cases were limited by
requiring the debtor to either file a plan of reorganization or commence
198. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
199. See 11 U.S.C § 362(d)(1).
200. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, CorporateGovernancein the Bankruptcy
ReorganizationofLarge, PubliclyHeld Companies,141 U. PA. L.REV. 669,693 (1993). Professors
LoPucki and Whitford did an empirical study of bankruptcies of the 43 largest publicly held
companies filing and completing bankruptcy during the period of their study. See id. at 675. They
found that the bankruptcy judge had extended the exclusivity period for the duration of the case in
34 of those 43 bankruptcy cases. See id. at 693.
201. See id. § 506(b).
202. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,382 (1988).
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B).
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interest payments within ninety days. 2° Second, changes were made to the
Bankruptcy Code to clarify the right of mortgage lenders with a duly
recorded assignment of rents to receive net rents from the property during
the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. 2°5 Despite these changes, it is
still possible under the Bankruptcy Code for certain undersecured creditors
to experience significant delays during which there is no compensation for
their lost opportunity cost. The question then is whether this delay can
create a takings claim.
Although bankruptcy law has historically given great deference to
security interests, there is historical support for the concept of a stay.
Although early bankruptcy statutes did not provide for an automatic stay,
the debtor could request a stay from the court.20 6 Since 1978, the stay has
been automatic. 7 This history suggests that there is nothing inherently
unconstitutional about the concept of the automatic stay. In UnitedSavings
Association v. Timbers of Inwood ForestAssociates, the Supreme Court
held that undersecured creditors are not entitled to interest on their
claims.2 8 Although the Supreme Court did not address the takings issue,
it affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit in which the takings issue was
addressed.2 9
The automatic stay, with its resulting delay to secured creditors,
constitutes regulation of the secured creditor's property interest. Therefore,
in determining whether there has been a taking, the question is whether the
regulation goes too far. Under the analysis of Lucas, there is no physical
invasion or denial of all economically beneficial use of the property
interest. Therefore, the ad hoc approach of Penn Centralmust be applied.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the damages remedy is
available for a temporary regulatory taking.210 In FirstEnglish, the Court
addressed the issue of whether the Takings Clause required compensation
204. See id. § 362(d)(3).
205. See id. § 522(b). For a discussion of the problem that this section was designed to resolve,
see generally Craig H. Averch, Revisitationofthe Fifth CircuitOpinionsof Village Propertiesand
Casbeer:Is Post-Petition"Perfection"ofanAssignmentofRentsNecessary to CharacterizeRental
Income as Cash Collateral?,93 CoM. L.J. 516 (1988); Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform and
More RationalApproach to Rents as Securityfor the MortgageLoan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349,
386-96 (1993); see, e.g., James McCafferty, TheAssignment ofRents in the CrucibleofBankruptcy,
94 CoM. L.J. 433 (1989); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing Lenders' Rents Interests in
Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 281 (1992); Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing
Confusion OverReal PropertyRents as Cash Collateralin Bankruptcy: The Needfora Consistent
Interpretation,5 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. I (Fall/Winter 1992-93).
206. See ihfra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
207. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
208. 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
209. 793 F.2d 1380, 1390 n.14 (5th Cir. 1986).
210. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304,
318 (1987).
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for regulatory takings that were temporary because they were ultimately
invalidated.2

The Court found that "'temporary' takings . . . are not

different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation. 2 2 Therefore, delay in a secured creditor's
ability to exercise remedies could conceivably create a takings claim.
Relevant to this inquiry of whether delay in bankruptcy could present
a takings claim are several United States Court of Appeals cases addressing
the takings issue when a lienholder was prevented from foreclosing
because of the existence of an inferior FDIC lien on property.2 3 Each of
these cases involved a provision of the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) that provides that property of
the FDIC may not be foreclosed without the FDIC's consent.214 This
provision has been interpreted to require the FDIC's consent in order215for
a prior lienholder to foreclose and wipe out a lien held by the FDIC.
In MatagordaCounty v. Law, local taxing authorities sued to foreclose
tax liens that were prior to a lien owned by the FDIC. 216 The taxing
authorities were prohibited from foreclosing for twenty-seven months, and
claimed a taking of their property rights based on the delay.2 17 The court
applied the ad hoc test to ultimately determine that there was no taking.2
With respect to the economic impact of the FIRREA provision, the court
found that "mere delay-at least the period of delay experienced to this
point-does not infringe on Appellants' total 'bundle' of rights to the point
of creating a compensable taking."2 9 With respect to investment-backed
expectations, the court noted that banking has long been a highly regulated
industry; however, prior to FIRREA, the taxing authorities would have
been able to enforce their tax liens." 0 With respect to the character of the
governmental action, the court found no physical invasion or permanent
appropriation; however, the court noted that "[u]nmitigated delay, coupled
with diminishment of distinct investment-backed expectations, may, at
some point, infringe on the entire 'bundle' of rights ... to the point that a

211. See id.
212. Id.
213. See Simon v.Cebrick, 53 F.3d 17,18-19 (3d Cir. 1995); Donnalndep. Sch. Dist. v. Balli,
21 F.3d 100, 100 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Law, 19 F.3d 215,218-23 (5th Cir. 1994).
214. 12 U.S.C. 1825(b)(2); see Simon, 53 F.3d at 19-20; Balli, 21 F.3d at 101; Law, 19 F.3d
at 218.
215. See Simon, 53 F.3d at 22; Law, 19 F.3d at 222-23; FDIC v. Lowrey, 12 F.3d 995, 996
(10th Cir. 1993).
216. 19 F.3d at 217.
217. See id. at 223, 225 n.11.
218. See id. at 223-25.
219. Id. at 224.
220. See id.

FLORIDA L4WREVIEW

[Vol. 51

compensable taking occurs. ' Although the court found no taking in a
delay of two years and three months, the court stated that this much delay
approached the maximum amount of delay that would be permitted without
finding a taking.222
In Donna IndependentSchool Districtv. Balli, decided only a month
afterMatagordaCounty, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again found no
taking in a case where taxing authorities were delayed in their ability to
foreclose because of an inferior FDIC lien.22 In this case, the delay was
significantly longer; however, the value of the property was sufficient to
pay both the entire amount of the tax liens and the entire amount of the
FDIC lien.224 Therefore, the taxing authorities could have sold the property
subject to the FDIC lien.2' Under these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit
was unwilling to find a taking.226
In Simon v. Cebrick, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found there
was no taking where a taxing authority's delay in foreclosing was one year
and seven months.227 The FDIC argued that the delay could not constitute
a taking since the taxing authority was accruing interest and the value of
the property was far in excess of the tax lien amount.228 Although finding
no taking, the court stated that "at some point a delay in the22ability
to
9
exercise property rights may constitute a compensable taking."
These cases suggest that at some point the operation of the automatic
stay in bankruptcy could constitute a taking. The argument would have to
be made with respect to an undersecured claim not entitled to the accrual
of interest and under circumstances in which the secured creditor was not
able to collect rent in order to receive compensation for lost opportunity
cost. Conceivably, if the delay caused by the automatic stay continued long
enough, there could be a taking. In Chapter 11 cases, debtors in some
bankruptcy cases are able to obtain multiple extensions of the exclusivity
period, so cases of extreme delay do exist. 230 The New Haven Inclusion
Cases, discussed above, can be distinguished because the Supreme Court

221. Id. at 225.
222. See id. at 225 n.11.
223. 21 F.3d at 100.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. 53 F.3d at 24.
228. See id.
229. Id.
230. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep't Stores, No. M-47 (PKL), 1991 W.L. 259036, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 25, 1991) (discussing Bankruptcy Court's grant of nine extensions of the exclusivity period,
with the total exclusivity period running from the April 25, 1990, filing date to the January 10,
1992, final extension date); see also LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 200, at 693 (discussing the
prevalence of long extensions of the exclusivity period in the reorganizations they studied).
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relied on the special nature of investment in a public utility such as a
that case were not entitled to
railroad in holding that the bondholders in
231
compensation for an extraordinary delay.
If a delay in foreclosure caused by FIRREA can be a taking, is the same
true of a delay caused by the automatic stay? The economic impact of the
regulation and the character of the governmental action are the same. The
lender's investment-backed expectations might be slightly different. The
Fifth Circuit in MatagordaCounty said that banking is a regulated industry
and that parties who deal with regulated industries are on notice that
Congress may act with respect to them.232 However, it was only after the
enactment of FIRREA in 1989 that prior lienholders were delayed in the
enforcement of their liens. There has been a comprehensive bankruptcy
system in place since 1898. Although the Bankruptcy Act had no
comprehensive stay provision taking effect automatically upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition,233 the Act did have provisions for automatic stays
in Chapter X234 and Chapter XII,23 and in other proceedings the debtor or
trustee could request that the court grant a stay.236 It was only with the
promulgation of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 1973 that an
automatic stay was introduced into the more commonly used bankruptcy
chapters.237 The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 made the automatic stay
applicable in all types of bankruptcy proceedings. 238 Therefore, there is
probably more historical precedent for the automatic stay in bankruptcy
than for the delay caused by FJRREA. This would affect investmentbacked expectations, making it less likely that the delay of the automatic
stay would be considered a taking. Therefore, only the most extraordinary
case of delay for a secured creditor could constitute a taking.239

231. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
232. 19 F.3d at 224.
233. See James J. White, The Recent Erosionof the Secured Creditor'sRights Through Cases,
Rules and Statutory Changesin Bankruptcy Law, 53 MiSs. L.J. 389, 397 n.29 (1983).
234. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, §§ 141, 30 Stat. 544 (as amended 1938) repealed
by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, P.L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2682.
235. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 428, 30 Stat. 544 (as amended 1938) repealed
by Act of Nov. 6, 1978, P.L. No. 95-598, § 401, 92 Stat. 2682.
236. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(j), 403(c), 513,516(4), 714, 1016; While, supra note 233, at 397
n.29.
237. See Bankruptcy Rule 11-44.
238. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, P.L. No. 95-598, § 362, 92 Stat. 2549, 2570 (1978)
(codified as amended at 11 U.S. § 362(a) (1994)).
239. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission addressed concerns over the delay
experienced by secured creditors in single asset real estate cases, although not expressed in terms
of a takings issue. NAT'LBANKR. REV. COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXTTWENTYYEARS, FINAL
REPORT 661-65 (1997). The Commission recommended that the $4 million cap in the definition
of a single asset real estate case be eliminated, that a plan must be filed or payments commenced
within 90 days after the date of the bankruptcy petition or within "30 days after the court
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2. Lien Avoidance Provisions
Despite the general deference to property rights in bankruptcy, a trustee
may in certain circumstances avoid transfers of property rights, including
security interests, bringing property of third parties into the bankruptcy
estate or freeing encumbered property. Therefore, under certain
circumstances, a secured creditor may lose a security interest entirely in
bankruptcy law and be left with only an unsecured claim. Although lien
avoidance provisions have been challenged on the basis that they take the
property rights of secured creditors without just compensation, the
provisions have been upheld against constitutional challenge.
Some of the avoidance provisions fall generally along the lines of state
law. For example, section 544(a) permits a trustee to avoid property
transfers that could be avoided by a judicial lien creditor, a creditor who
has obtained an execution against the debtor, or a bona fide purchaser from
the debtor.2' This section relies entirely upon state law to determine which
interests the trustee may avoid and has been upheld against constitutional
challenge on that basis. 241 State law provides a procedure for perfecting a
security interest by taking certain steps, such as recording or filing,
generally designed to give notice of the interest to third parties.242
Recordation of mortgages dates back to the colonies,243 so the concept of
perfection, although primarily embodied in legislation, could certainly be
considered a "background principal of property law," which defines the

determines" that the single asset real estate provisions are applicable, and that payments required
under the section be based upon the "nondefault contract rate" of interest rather than upon the fair
market rate. Id. at 32-33,664. In addition, the Commission recommended limitations on the ability
of a single asset real estate debtor to confirm a plan that would strip down the secured creditor's
claim to the value of property using the new value exception to the absolute priority rule. See id.
at 34, 665. The Commission's recommendation would require that new value contributed reduce
the amount of the secured claim to no more than 80% of the value of the property. See id. at 73,
665. Therefore, the Commission's recommendations, if adopted, would further limit the delay
allowed in certain cases and would increase the amount paid to the secured creditor in such cases.
The recommendations would give additional protection to the property rights of real property
secured creditors and would therefore make a successful takings claim less likely.
240. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1994).
241. See generally Pirsig Farms, Inc. v. John Deere Co. (In re Pirsig Farms, Inc.), 46 B.R. 237,
244 (1985) ("Deere's failure to perfect its liens, not section 544(a) caused Deere to lose its security
interests."); Washburn & Roberts, Inc. v. Park East (In reWashburn & Roberts, Inc.), 17 B.R. 305,
308 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1982) ("[T]he enactment did not divest the defendants of the property, but
rather the divestiture is occasioned by their failure to record the deed.").
242. See, e.g., Washburn & Roberts, 17 B.R. at 307 (noting that under Washington state law,
a conveyance of property to a person is void against subsequent bonafide purchases if an instrument
regarding the conveyance is not duly recorded).
243. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E.KRIER, PRoPERTY 651 (4th ed. 1998).
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property interest.2 " In addition, a secured creditor may take whatever steps
are required under state law to perfect the security interest and may
therefore prevent avoidance under this section. As a result, a secured
creditor would have a difficult case showing investment-backed
expectations in an unperfected security interest. Therefore, section 544(a)
does not present a takings problem.
Section 548 permits a trustee to avoid fraudulent transfers.245 Although
section 548 creates a federal fraudulent transfer law,246 it is consistent with
fraudulent transfer principles under state law.247 Fraudulent transfer law
dates back to the Statute of Elizabeth, adopted in 1570,248 and should
therefore be a background principal defining the interest of a secured
creditor. In addition, a secured creditor does not have investment-backed
expectations in retaining property transferred by an insolvent debtor.249
Therefore, section 548 also does not present a takings problem.
Section 522(t)(2) permits the avoidance of non-possessory, nonpurchase money liens on household furnishings, appliances, and certain
types of exempt property.25' The property may be exempt under state law
or under bankruptcy law. Some courts and commentators have assumed
that the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this section, applied
prospectively only, in the Security Industrialcase. 1 However, the Court
only addressed the issue of whether the statute was to be applied
retroactively, holding that it should not.z 2 In the absence of precedent
requiring prospective application of bankruptcy legislation, the concurring
justices would have found that the section applied retroactively and was
constitutional for a number of reasons relating to the specific nature of the
security interests invalidated and because the section was limited in its
application to only a few types of property. 3 In addition, the affected
244. See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
245. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
246. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,535 (1994).
247. See Harris & MooneyA Property-BasedTheory, supranote 2, at 2069 n.142 (comparing
§ 548's provisions addressing actual fraud and constructive fraud with the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act §§ 4-7, 7A U.L.A. 504-09 (1918) and the Uniform FraudulentTransfer Act §§ 4(a)
& 5(a), 7A U.L.A. 652,653,657 (1984)).
248. See Hartvig v. Tri-City Baptist Temple (In re Gomes), 219 B.R. 286,297 (Bankr. D. OR.
1998).

249. See id. at 288.
250. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2).
251. See, e.g., In re Thompson, 867 F.2d 416,422 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Security
Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982).
252. The plaintiffs in the case were holders of security interests that were created prior to the
passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
253. See Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. at 84. The complete list of reasons the concurring
justices gave for finding the provision constitutional, even applied retroactively, are as follows:
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security interests "have little direct value and weight in [their] own right
and [appear] useful mainly as a convenient tool with which to threaten the
debtor .... ,", These are the very reasons that the section is constitutional
when applied prospectively.
Section 522(f)(1) provides for the avoidance of judicial liens to the
extent they impair an exemption to which a debtor would otherwise be
entitled.2 5 A recent challenge to the constitutionality of section 522(f)(1)
was rejected by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 2 6 The First Circuit
adopted Professor Rogers' reasoning in upholding the validity of the
section, finding that the creditor's "property rights in the lien are
circumscribed by the debtor's ability under the Code to avoid the lien." 7
Although the court's reasoning is faulty, the result is correct. First, an
owner of property has no strand in the bundle of property rights regarding
the attachment of a judicial lien to property. A creditor would not have
sufficient investment-backed expectations in a judicial lien. The judicial
lien creditor's "investment" in the lien is presumably only the cost of the
lawsuit required to obtain it. In addition, the reach of section 522(f)(1) is
limited, applying only to property that is exempt."8 Therefore, the section
should withstand constitutional challenge.
Only the avoidance of preferences under section 547 is based purely on
bankruptcy rather than state law principles.259 Section 547(b) provides that

because the exemptions in question are limited as to kinds of property and as to
values; because the amount loaned has little or no relationship to the value of the
property; because these asserted lien interests come close to being contracts of
adhesion; because repossessions by small loan companies in this kind of situation
are rare; because the purpose of the statute is salutary and is to give the debtor a
fresh start with a minimum for necessities; because there has been creditor abuse;
because Congress merely has adjusted priorities, and has not taken for the
Government's use or for public use; because the exemption provisions in question
affect the remedy and not the debt; because the security interest seems to have
little direct value and weight in its own right and appears useful mainly as a
convenient tool with which to threaten the debtor to reaffirm the underlying
obligation; because the statute is essentially economic regulation and insubstantial
at that; and because there is an element of precedent favorable to the debtor to be
found in such cases as Penn Central ....
Id.
254. Id. For this very reason, the Federal Trade Commission has a credit practices rule
prohibiting creditors from taking a non-possessory, non-purchase money security interest in
household goods. See 16 C.F.R. § 444.2(a)(4) (1999).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1).
256. See Patriot Portfolio, LLC v. Weinstein (In re Weinstein), 164 F.3d 677, 679 (1st Cir.
1999).
257. Id. at 686.
258. 11 U.S.C. § 522()(1).
259. See Harris & Mooney, A Property-BasedTheory, supra note 2, at 2069.
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the trustee may avoid certain transfers of property made to creditors within
ninety days before bankruptcy in payment of an antecedent debt.26 The
Sixth Circuit upheld that section against a takings challenge on the basis
of notice.261 While the court's explanation was overly simplified, the result
is correct. Because one requirement of the preference provision is that no
new value be given, it is difficult to argue that a creditor's expectations in
receiving a preferential transfer were "investment-backed." In addition,
section 547(b) was a successor to a provision of the Bankruptcy Act which,
although slightly different, had similar requirements. 262 Therefore, the
section should not present a takings problem.
In summary, I believe a successful takings claim based on current
bankruptcy law is unlikely. The authors of the Bankruptcy Code considered
the Fifth Amendment in drafting it. The Code gives a great deal of respect
to property interests, including those of secured creditors. Lien avoidance
provisions have been upheld against constitutional challenge, and only the
most extraordinary case of delay might result in a successful takings claim.
B. ProspectiveInvalidationof Security Interests
Although current bankruptcy law protects security interests except in
certain narrow circumstances, recent proposals by some scholars would
give far less protection to the property rights of secured creditors than they
currently enjoy.263 Based on Professor Rogers' reasoning, a number of
scholars have posited that prospective legislation completely invalidating
security interests in bankruptcy would not run afoul of the Takings
Clause.2 4 Therefore, I will now explore the constitutionality of

260. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
261. See Hertzberg v. H. Hirschfield & Sons (In re Caro Products, Inc.), 746 F.2d 349, 351
(6th Cir. 1984).
262. See 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1946) (repealed). One major difference between the old and new
preference provisions was that the old provision required that the creditor have "reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor [was] insolvent." Id.
263. See, e.g., Bebchuk &Fried, The Uneasy Case,supra note 2, at 904; LoPucki, supranote

1,at 1963.
•264. See Baird & Jackson, supra note 15, at 100 ("Congress, acting prospectively, probably
could refuse to recognize the rights of secured creditors altogether."); Carlson, supra note 15, at
585-86 ('Ihere is little doubt that Congress can adversely affect security interests prospectively,
even to the point of banning them altogether."); Eisenberg, supra note 15, at 952 n.69 ("Congress
probably is free to change prospectively the status of security in bankruptcy, perhaps even to the
point of eliminating its priority."); Nickles, supra note 154, at 593 (In the "struggle between
commercial law and bankruptcy," bankruptcy could "ignore liens altogether in bankruptcy (at least
prospectively)."); see also Artus v. Alaska Dept. of Labor (In re Anchorage Int'l Inn, Inc.), 718
F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Congress has the authority to make uniform laws governing the
subject of bankruptcies, and, pursuant to that authority, might invalidate in bankruptcy any or all
pre-bankruptcy entitlements encumbering the debtor's assets.") (citations omitted).
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hypothetical bankruptcy legislation that would completely invalidate
security interests in bankruptcy on a prospective basis.265
The prospective nature of this hypothetical bankruptcy legislation is
crucial to the discussion. Retroactive invalidation of all security interests
in bankruptcy would most certainly be a taking of property rights. 26 The
Supreme Court did not decide the takings issue in Security Industrial,but
did find "substantial doubt" about the constitutionality of retroactive
application of a provision that invalidates certain types of liens in certain
types of collateral.267 The Supreme Court found a taking in Annstrong v.
United States, a case in which the government took possession of
unfinished navy boats after default by the prime contractor and thus
prohibited materialmen from enforcing their liens.2 68 The Court held that
the "total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens, which
constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid
regulatory measure."'
Therefore, a government destruction of all
compensable value of existing security interests in bankruptcy would
similarly constitute a taking.
Prospective legislation, however, can be viewed differently. Professor
Rogers argued that prospective legislation by definition does not affect
security interests in existence at the time of passage of the legislation and
that any security interest created after passage would be created subject to
and defined by bankruptcy law then in effect.270 The legislation, however,
would affect owners of property at the time of its passage by restricting
their ability to create a security interest that could survive bankruptcy.27
The two parties potentially in a position to complain about the legislation
would be property owners who might desire to create security interests and
owners of security interests created after the passage of the legislation.
Therefore, the issue must be discussed from both points of view-that of
the property owner at the time the legislation is passed and that of the
owner of a security interest conveyed after passage of the legislation.272

265. I will sometimes refer to this hypothetical legislation as the invalidation proposal.
266. The Court has held on a number of occasions that even small property interests are
entitled to Fifth Amendment protection. See United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70,
76 (1982); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982). See
generally LArros, supra note 22, part V (discussing retroactivity in the takings context).
267. 459 U.S. at 78.
268. 364 U.S. 40,41 (1968).
269. Id. at 48, quoted in Security Indus., 459 U.S. at 77.
270. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 987.
271. See Bebchuk & Fried, FurtherThoughts, supra note 2, at 1290-91.
272. See id. at 1290.
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1. Property Owner's Perspective
All property owners would be affected by legislation that invalidated
security interests in bankruptcy. Such legislation would limit the right of
property owners to alienate their property. In particular, property owners
would be unable to transfer a security interest that could survive a
bankruptcy filing. The question then is whether an owner's ability to create
a security interest is such an important property right that a restriction
thereon can be a taking. Professor Rogers completely ignored this issue in
his analysis, focusing only on the effects of prospective legislation on
secured creditors. 273
The Supreme Court has held that the taking of one strand of an owner's
bundle of property rights can, under some circumstances, violate the
Takings Clause.27 However, not all strands in the bundle are sufficiently
important. In Andrus v. Allard,275 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of federal statutes and regulations that prohibited the sale
of Indian artifacts made with feathers from eagles and other protected
birds.276 The Court first held that the statutes and regulations prohibited the
sale of artifacts made with feathers obtained legally before the statutes
were adopted.'V The Court then upheld the statutes and regulations, stating
that "the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount
to a taking." 27 The Court found it crucial that the owners of the artifacts
retained "the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate
or devise the protected birds."279
Later in the same term, the Court decided another case involving one
right in the bundle of sticks, holding that a taking of the right to exclude
others from a part of a landowner's property required compensation.
KaiserAetna v. UnitedStates8 ° involved a developer who had dredged a
channel between Kuapa Pond, a private pond on its land, and Maunalau
Bay in order to create a private marina with access to the Pacific Ocean.281
The Corps of Engineers claimed that the pond had become a navigable

273. See Rogers, supra note 6.
274. Professor Mandelker calls this functional segmentation. See Daniel R. Mandelker, New
Property Rights Under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 12 (1997). "Functional
segmentation occurs when government intervention or regulation segments intangible,
nonpossessory property rights." Id.

275. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
276. See id. at 53-54.
277. See id. at63.

278. ad at 65.
279. Id. at 66.
280. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
281. Seeid.at167.
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waterway and that the public could not be denied access.282 The Court held
that the government could not require public access without
compensation.283 The Court said that the right to exclude was "one of the
most essential sticks in 2 the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property." "
More recently, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a statute
which abolished the rights of descent and devise for a particular class of
property without compensation in Hodel v. Irving.285 The Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983 2 6provided that certain small fractional interests
in tribal land could not pass by intestacy or devise but would escheat to the
tribe. The statute did not provide for compensation to the owners of these
interests that would escheat.2 7 The suit was brought by parties who would
have inherited interests in tribal land, but on behalf of the decedents.288
Therefore, the issue was whether the statute, by completely destroying the
right to transfer by descent or devise, violated the Takings Clause. 28 9 The
Court held that it did.290
Ten years later, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an amended
version of the same statute in Babbitt v. Youpee.291 The amended statute
permitted the devise of interests that would otherwise escheat to parties
already owning an interest in the same parcel.29 Justice Stevens argued
that the decedent, with notice of the statute for more than seven years
before his death, "could have realized the value of his fractional interests
in a variety of ways, including selling the property, giving it to his
children as a gift, or putting it in trust for them., 293 The majority focused
on the limitations on his right to devise, even after the amendment of the
statute, stating that "[a]llowing a decedent to leave an interest only to a
current owner in the same parcel shrinks drastically the universe of
possible successors.""29 Therefore, the Court found that the amendment of
...

282. See id. at 168.
283. See id. at 179-80.
284. Id. at 176.
285. 481 U.S. 704,706 (1987).
286. Pub. L. No. 97-459, Tit. II,
96 Stat. 2519, § 207 (1983).
287. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 709.
288. See id. at 711.
289. See id. at 706.
290. See id. at 717.
291. 519 U.S. 234, 236 (1997).
292. See id. at 241. Other revisions changed the formula for determining which interests were
escheatable interests and gave tribes the right to override the statute with their own schemes for
consolidation of the interests. See id.
293. Id. at 247 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
294. Id. at 244-45.
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the statute did not eliminate the takings problem. 95
The Court's holding in Irving was unanimous, but thejustices disagreed
over the effect of the decision on Andrus.296 Three of the justices felt that
Andrus was not limited and that the issues in the Irving case were
unusual.' Three other justices felt that Andrus had been limited to its
facts. 298 In Andrus, the Court had made clear that not all rights in the
bundle of property rights are so important that a taking of one strand will
require compensation.299 In KaiserAetna and Irving, the Court made clear
that some rights in the bundle are that important."° The question then is
whether the ability to create a security interest is such a fundamental strand
in the bundle of rights.
The invalidation of security interests in bankruptcy would not prohibit
the creation of a security interest, but would eliminate an owner's ability
to create a security interest that could survive a bankruptcy filing. This
could, in and of itself, constitute a taking. In Irving, the Court found
relevant that the right to pass property to one's family "has been part of the
Anglo-American legal system since feudal times."30 x The right to grant a
security interest, at least in real property, has been part of the AngloAmerican legal system since before feudal times.3" Thus, the invalidation
proposal could be a taking because of limitations it would impose on a
property owner's right to create a security interest.
In addition, the invalidation proposal could, as a practical matter, limit
the availability of secured credit. 3 Limitations on the availability of
secured credit could have a substantial effect on the ability of property
owners to transfer those types of property which traditionally have required
295. See id.
296. Irving, 481 U.S. at 718.
297. See id. (Brennan, Marshall & Blackman, J.J., concurring).
298. See id. at 719 (Scalia & Powell, J.J. & Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
299. 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979).
300. See Irving, 481 U.S. at 715-717; Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 164-65.
301. Irving, 481 U.S. at 716.
302. See Kratovil, supra note 165, at 1 ("[M]ortgage arrangements of various kinds existed
even in the Anglo-Saxon times before the conquest of England by William the Conqueror in 1066
A.D.").
303. Congress has considered before the effect that bankruptcy limitations on the rights of
secured creditors would have on the availability of secured credit. See, e.g., Bankruptcy ReformAct
of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 707,714 (1977) (statement
of Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice President, Real Est. Div., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.), 715 (statement
of Robert E.O'Malley, attorney, Covington & Burling) (expressing concern that permitting
modification of home mortgage loans in Chapter 13 would have a negative impact on the
availability of home mortgage credit); Conference Report, June 18, 1934, 73rd Cong. 2nd Sess.,
78 Cong. Rec. 12,074 (statement of Senator Bankhead), 12,075 (statement of Senator Fess), 12,137
(siatement of Representative Peyser) (evidencing concern that applying the Frazier-Lemke Act to
future mortgages would make it impossible for farmers to borrow).
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secured financing for purchase-primarily land. If secured financing or
some substitute were not available, some land transfers might not occur at
all. Although the Supreme Court held that prohibition on transfer of Indian
artifacts made with feathers was not a taking, it is difficult to believe that
a substantial limitation on transfer of land would be similarly viewed.'
Therefore, whether the measure would constitute a taking would depend
not only upon the importance of the right to grant a security interest, but
also upon the extent to which it interfered with a property owner's right to
transfer property. If the proposal interfered substantially with the right to
transfer land, it would be an unconstitutional taking.
2. Secured Creditor's Perspective
a. Applying the Takings Formula
Even if the proposal is not a taking from the property owner's point of
view, it could still be a taking from the secured creditor's point of view.
With prospective legislation, the secured creditor would take the security
interest with notice of bankruptcy law in place on the date of the creation
of the interest. The issue then is the effect of that notice. To understand the
relevance of retroactivity in takings jurisprudence, it is necessary to
understand where the notice factor fits into the takings formula. There are
two places where it could fit. First, a prospective statute may define the
property interest itself. This is the approach that Professor Rogers took."'5
He assumed that the property interest of a secured creditor is defined by
bankruptcy law, including recent changes, as well as by state law. 06
Second, the prospective nature of a statute may be tied to the takings
formula because of the factor of investment-backed expectations. If a
property owner knows of limitations affecting a property interest, then the
owner's investment-backed expectations in that property are limited. This
is the approach of the Supreme Court in the Monsanto case discussed

304. See Andrus, 444 U.S. at 67-68. Justice Scalia, in the Lucas opinion, indicated that
regulations affecting land should be examined more strenuously than regulations affecting personal
property. See 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992); see also Fred P. Bosselman, Scalia on Land, in
AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION

(David L. Callies ed. 1993).
305. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 987.
306. See id. at 986-88. Rogers says "the proposition that the fifth amendment imposes
limitation on even purely prospective restriction of the rights of secured creditors seems to assume
that the property rights held by secured creditors are in some sense anterior to positive law." Id. at
987; see also Carlson, supra note 15, at 585-86 (stating that security interests become property
interests by definition when Congress prospectively bans them on some exempt consumer goods).
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below' and of other courts that apply a notice rule in takings." 8
The Supreme Court has rejected Professor Rogers' approach to defining
property rights, holding that the extent of a property interest is determined
by "background principles of property law."3 9 Even if the concept of
background principles of property law does encompass federal legislation
as well as state common law, the invalidation proposal would not be a
background principle. Bankruptcy law gives great deference to security
interests and to other property rights both traditionally and currently.31
Therefore, newly enacted bankruptcy legislation would not redefine the
property rights of secured creditors.
If a newly enacted statute does not define the property interest, then
notice of the statute may fit into the takings formula only through the
investment-backed expectations factor. However, investment-backed
expectations are a factor in the takings formula only if there is a regulatory
taking that is not a categorical taking. A categorical taking occurs if
regulation requires a physical invasion of property3 " or if a regulation
denies all economically beneficial use of land. 312 There is certainly no
physical invasion of property raised by the invalidation proposal. There
may be a denial of all economically beneficial use of property if this
categorical taking is not limited in its application to land&31 3 since the entire
interest of the secured creditor is taken. 4
More convincing is an argument that the invalidation proposal is not a
regulatory taking at all but rather an appropriation or destruction of
property. 35 The Supreme Court acknowledged in Security Industrialthat

307. See infra notes 326-34 and accompanying text.
308. See infra note 324.

309. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 32,49-53 and accompanying text.
311. The Supreme Court has held that a physical invasion of property, no matter how small,
constitutes a taking. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421
(1982).
312. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
313. In Lucas, Justice Scalia said that a categorical taking resulted when a regulation led to
denial of all economically beneficial use of land. 505 U.S. at 1015.
314. Whether there has been a denial of all economically beneficial use depends upon the
resolution ofwhat is commonly known as the "denominator problem." Justice Scalia mentioned the
denominator problem in footnote 7 in the Lucas opinion, but did not offer a solution as it was not
an issue in that case. 505 U.S. at 1018 n.7. Theissue raised by the denominator problem isjust what
is the unit of property to be used in determining whether a regulation denies all economically
beneficial use of property. See infra notes 355-56 and accompanying text, discussing the
segmentation issue, which is related to the denominator problem.
315. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the sale of assets is conducted by a trustee. If the trustee were
to sell property free and clear of a lien, then were to transfer proceeds of the sale pro rata to all of
the debtor's creditors, there is an appropriation. If a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 debtor keeps property
free of a lien, with no obligation on the part of the debtor to pay the value of the property to the
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"a complete destruction of the right of the secured party... fits but
awkwardly into the analytic framework employed in [regulatory takings
cases]. 31 6 In Phillips,the Court distinguished "confiscatory regulations"
from "those regulating the use of property. ' 31 7 The invalidation proposal
is confiscatory rather than regulatory from the secured creditor's
perspective.318 The fact that the interest is appropriated for the benefit of
parties other than the government does not make it any less an
appropriation.3 9 Therefore, a strong argument exists that a court would
never reach the ad hoc test, which requires a consideration of investmentbacked expectations, and would thus find that the invalidation proposal is
a confiscatory taking.
If the ad hoc test does apply, then it could be applied as follows. First,
the economic impact of the invalidation proposal upon the holder of a
security interest would be substantial. The secured creditor would be
treated the same as unsecured creditors in the bankruptcy. If there were
large unsecured claims, then the secured creditor like most unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy might receive only cents on the dollar for the claim.
Second, the character of the government regulation is, as in Irving,
extraordinary. The security interest would be abrogated in its entirety.
Finally, reasonable investment-backed expectations are arguably not very
high. The secured creditor would have actual or constructive notice of the
invalidation of the security interest in the event of a bankruptcy. Whether
the invalidation proposal would withstand constitutional scrutiny under the
ad hoc test depends on the effect of this factor in the balancing test.
Therefore, more discussion of reasonable investment-backed expectations
is necessary.
b. Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations
The reasonable investment-backed expectations factor originated in an
article published in 1967 by Professor Frank Michelman. 320 Justice
Brennan adopted "distinct investment-backed expectations" as one of three
factors in the takings formula enunciated in Penn CentralTransportation

secured creditor, there is a destruction.

316. 459 U.S. 70,75 (citations omitted).
317. 118 S. Ct. 1925, 1931 (1998). "[Alt least as to confiscatory regulations (as opposed to
those regulating the use of property), a State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing
traditional property interests long recognized under state law." Id.
318. See infranotes 387-90 and accompanying text.
319. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (1998).
320. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1967); see also Robert
M. Washburn, "ReasonableInvestment-Backed Expectations" As a Factorin Defining Property
Interests,49 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L 63 (1996) (discussing the origin of the phrase).
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Co. v. New York City. 21 Later, the court began using the language
"reasonable investment-backed expectations,""s and has continued using
this language. 3 In this section I will discuss the effect of investmentbacked expectations in the context of the invalidation proposal.
Some courts and commentators treat the reasonable investment-backed
expectations factor as encompassing a notice rule."2 The argument is that
when a party purchases property with notice of regulations affecting the
property, the purchaser has no reasonable investment-backed expectations
with respect to the interest in the property affected by the regulations. This
lack of reasonable investment-backed expectations arguably precludes a
finding that property rights have been taken. Although some courts have
adopted a notice rule in takings cases, the Supreme Court has rejected a
strict notice rule.3"
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 26 the Court seemed to adopt a notice
rule based on the reasonable investment-backed expectations requirement.
Monsanto involved the constitutionality of federal legislation that
authorized the EPA to use data submitted by a pesticide registration
applicant to evaluate subsequent applications and authorizing the EPA to
disclose some data to the public.327 Monsanto argued that the use and
disclosure of trade secrets constituted a taking of property without just
compensation. 28 The Court first determined that Monsanto did have a
property interest in the data it had submitted to the EPA.329 In determining
whether a taking had occurred, the Court focused on the reasonable
investment-backed expectations factor.3 ° The Court held:
Monsanto could not have had a reasonable, investmentbacked expectation that EPA would keep the data confidential
beyond the limits prescribed in the amended statute itself.
Monsanto was on notice of the manner in which EPA was
authorized to use and disclose any data turned over to it by an
applicant for registration.'
321. See 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
322. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
323. See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2146 (1998); Hodel v. Irving, 481
U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984); Pruneyard
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (citing KaiserAetna,444 U.S. at 175).
324. See Anello v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 678 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 2 (1997); Grant v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 461 S.E.2d 388, 391 (S.C. 1995).
325. See infra notes 335-42 and accompanying text.
326. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).

327. See id. at 990.
328.
329.
330.
331.

See id. at 998-99.
See id. at 1003-04.
See id.
Id. at 1006.
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The Court went on to stress that the sale and use of pesticides had long
been a source of public concern and a subject of governmental
regulation.332 Monsanto had a reasonable investment-backed expectation
only for the period during which the government had explicitly provided
for confidentiality. 333 Therefore, the Court's interpretation of the
reasonable investment-backed expectations factor was tied substantially to
the question of notice. After the Court's holding in Monsanto,lower courts
relied on Monsanto as the basis of a notice rule in takings cases. 34
However, the Court rejected a notice rule three years later in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission.335 In Nollan, the Court found a taking
when the California Coastal Commission required a public access
easement as a condition to granting a permit to the Nollans to build a new
home on their beachfront property. 336 Justice Brennan, in his dissenting
opinion, argued that there was no taking because the Nollans purchased the
property with notice of regulation of development and with notice that the
access easement condition had been imposed on other development
projects. 337 As a result, Justice Brennan would have held that the Nollans
did not have reasonable investment-backed expectations in the right to
develop their property.338
The majority of the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, rejected
Justice Brennan's application of a notice rule to the case and distinguished
the case from Monsanto.339 The Court limited the holding in Monsanto to
cases involving "the right to [a] valuable Government benefit," and
34 1
found that the right to build on property was not a government benefit.
The Court went on to state:
Nor are the Nollans' rights altered because they acquired the
land well after the Commission had begun to implement its
policy. So long as the Commission could not have deprived
the prior owners of the easement without compensating them,
the prior owners must be understood to have transferred their

332. See id. at 1007.
333. Seeid.atlOll.
334. See Daniel R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Takings Law, 27 URB.
LAW. 215, 219 (1995); see, e.g., Furey v. City of Sacramento, 592 F. Supp. 463, 470 (E.D. Cal.
1984), aff'd on othergrounds,780 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986).
335. 483 U.S. 825, 835-42 (1987).
336. See id. at 337.
337. See id. at 859.
338. See id. at 860.
339. See id. at 833 n.2.
340. Id. (quoting Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007).
341. See id. at 834 n.2.
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full property rights in conveying the lot.342
Therefore, the Court rejected a notice rule.
The invalidation proposal can be distinguished from the Nollan case on
several bases, but none of the distinctions should be the basis for applying
a strict notice rule to the invalidation proposal. The first distinction is that
Nollan involved a physical invasion of real property, and the invalidation
proposal does not. "[T]akings problems are more commonly presented
when 'the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government, than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good."' 343 However, economic regulation can be a taking as the
Court recently held in Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.?4 In Eastern
Enterprises,the Court considered the validity of the Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of 19 9 2 , 4 which would have retroactively required
Eastern Enterprises to pay $50 to $100 million into a benefit plan for
employees the company employed between 1946 and 1965. Because the
legislation was retroactive, the Court focused on Eastern's reasonable
investment-backed expectations, finding that Eastern could not have had
"sufficient notice" that this amount of liability could be imposed several
decades after its involvement in the coal industry.346 Significantly, the
legislation struck down in EasternEnterprisesdid not affect any specific
property right or interest but rather created a general liability for the
payment of money. The Court had previously refused to find a taking in
other cases imposing a general liability even retroactively.' 7 The case is
important because it illustrates that no one factor in the ad hoe test is
determinative, and investment-backed expectations arejust one of the three
factors to be considered along with the character of the government action
and the economic impact. The Court found a taking in EasternEnterprises
where the character of the governmental action was an economic regulation
creating a general liability.3 48 The Court also found a taking in Nollan
where the character of the governmental action was a physical invasion and
there was prior notice of the regulation." The fact that prior notice affects
reasonable investment-backed expectations should not preclude a finding

342. Id.
343. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131,2146 (1998) (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).

344. Id.
345. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-9722 (1994 Ed. & Supp. II).
346. See Eastern Enters., 118 S. Ct. at 2151-52.
347. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602,605
(1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,228 (1986).
348. 118 S. Ct. at 2161.
349. 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1987).
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of an unconstitutional taking.
Another distinction that can be drawn between the invalidation proposal
and Nollan is the type of post-regulation transfer involved. In Nollan, the
entire fee simple ownership of the land was transferred to the new owners,
including the right to bring a takings claim." 0 With respect to the
invalidation proposal, only an interest in the property, a security interest,
would be transferred with notice. The specific interest transferred is the
very interest that would be invalid in bankruptcy under the proposal. This
raises the so-called "denominator" and "segmentation" issues. The
"denominator" issue involves determining the "'property interest' against
which the loss of value is to be measured."3 The "segmentation" issue
arises when only part of an owner's property is conveyed, separating the
regulated portion from the unregulated portion.
In Penn Central TransportationCo. v. New York City,"2 the Supreme
Court held that New York City's landmarks preservation law, which
prohibited Penn Central from using the air rights above its terminal, was
not a taking. The court considered the three factors that it first enunciated
in that case 53 and ultimately determined that Penn Central could still profit
from the terminal and receive a reasonable return on its investment without
using the air rights. But what if the air rights had been owned separately at
the time of regulation or had been conveyed after the regulation was
adopted?35 4 The conveyance of the regulated portion of the owner's
property rights would raise the segmentation issue.
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the segmentation
problem in Loveladies Harbor,Inc. v. United States. 355 In Loveladies, a
developer sought a permit from the Army Corp of Engineers to fill a 12.5acre tract for residential development. 35 The developer had originally
owned a 250-acre tract acquired in 1958, but 199 of the 250 acres had been
357
developed before the enactment of section 404 of the Clean Water Act.
With 51 acres remaining and 50 of those needing to be filled for
development, the developer had agreed with the New Jersey Department

350. See id. at 826.
351. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7 (1992).
352. 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978).
353. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
354. When I teach this case, I always ask my students if it would make a difference if the air
rights had been owned by a different party. Students frequently answer that it would, because the
owner of the air rights would then have no use whatsoever for them. I next ask whether Penn
Central could sell the air rights after the prohibition on their use had been imposed. Most students
assume that this would not be an appropriate way for Penn Central to avoid the application of the
Supreme Court's holding of no taking.
355. 28F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
356. See id. at 1174.
357. See id.
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of Environmental Protection to dedicate 38.5 of the remaining 51 acres to
the state.358 Since one acre was already filled, the developer sought a
permit from the Corps of Engineers to fill 11.5 acres of wetlands.3 5 9 At
issue was the relevant parcel for determining whether'there had been a
taking. The government argued that using the 12.5-acre tract as the relevant
denominator parcel "would encourage strategic behavior on the part of
developers-'conveying away the non-wetland portions of their parcels
prior to applying to the Corps for a permit to fill the remaining
wetlands.'",3' The court, however, considered "the timing of transfers in
light of the developing regulatory environment., 361 Because the 199 acres
had been developed or sold before the regulatory environment existed and
because the 38.5 acres were to be transferred in exchange for the New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection permit, the court
concluded that the relevant parcel was the 12.5-acre tract.362
The government's concern in Loveladies that owners should not be able
to sever the very part of the owner's property that is subject to regulation
in order to create a takings claim that would not otherwise exist is a valid
concern in the context of horizontal segmentation as in Loveladies3 63 or
vertical segmentation as in Penn Central.3" Functional or conceptual
segmentation of different strands in the bundle of property rights does not
raise the same concern.365 Secured parties do not take security interests and
property owners do not convey them in order to segment the portion of the
property subject to regulation. Therefore, the security interests can be
treated as a separate property interest for purposes of applying the takings
formula without concern over "strategic behavior." This is true even where
the secured creditor has notice of the invalidation proposal at the time of
the creation of its interest. The question is whether a property owner, who
arguably does not have a takings claim based on the inability to create a
security interest that could survive bankruptcy, 366 can convey that very
interest to a secured creditor and create a takings claim in the secured
creditor. However, the secured creditor's notice of the invalidation of the
interest in bankruptcy does not encourage the creation of the security
interest in order to create a takings claim that would not otherwise exist.
Another potential distinction between the invalidation proposal and

358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

See id.at 1180.
See id.at 1174, 1180.
Id. at 1181.
Id.
See id.
at 1181, 1183.
See id.
at 1180.
See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
See supra note 274 regarding functional segmentation.
See supra Part IV.B.1.
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Nollan relates to the ripeness problem that arises with transfers of the
entire interest of an owner in property. The Supreme Court's apparent
reason for disavowing a notice rule in Nollan was that the property owners
should be treated as having conveyed the entire interest in the property
including any takings claims. One criticism of a notice rule is that it would
require current owners to assert takings claims or lose them. 67 The
Nollan's predecessors had no cause of action against the Coastal
Commission because their claim could not be ripe until they pursued a
development plan. If a sale of the property would destroy any possibility
of a claim, then landowners would be forced to make their claims ripe or
lose them upon a sale of the property.
The ripeness problem also arises with respect to the invalidation
proposal, but in a different way. A secured creditor whose security interest
was created after adoption of the invalidation proposal would not have a
takings claim at the time the security interest was created based only on the
risk of the loss of that interest in the event of a bankruptcy. The secured
creditor's claim could only arise if a bankruptcy did occur, thus
invalidating the security interest. The taking, if any, would occur only
when the security interest was destroyed.
The problem with the notice rule as applied to the invalidation proposal
is that the secured creditor has notice only of a risk of bankruptcy, not of
a certainty. Professor Mandelker has discussed the relationship between
notice and reasonable investment-backed expectations in the context of
regulatory risk. 68 He refers to situations where regulations change, but also
to situations where there is uncertainty about whether the government will
grant a needed permit. He concludes: "Courts should recognize landowner
refuse to recognize
expectations when risks are minimal. They should
369
high."
are
risks
when
landowner expectations
Some of Professor Mandelker's ideas regarding regulatory risk can be
applied in the context of bankruptcy risk. Depending upon the financial
stability of the debtor, the risk of bankruptcy may be relatively low.
However, under the invalidation proposal, the secured creditor's loss in the
event of bankruptcy is very high. Thus, in most circumstances, bankruptcy
is a low-probability, high-loss event. Empirical research indicates that for
various reasons, people tend to underestimate the likelihood of the
occurrence of low-probability, high-loss events.370 Therefore, a secured

367. See Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 RegulatoryTakings Quartet:RetreatingFrom the "Rule
of Law," 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 368-69 (1998).
368. See Mandelker, supra note 334, at 240-43.
369. Id.
370. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK 22 (1986); HOWARD KUNREUTHER,
DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION 185-86 (1978); Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the
American Dream: A Critical Evaluationof the Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity

BANKRUPTCY TA KNGS

creditor may actually underestimate the risk of bankruptcy. 371
Of course, large institutional lenders with many secured loans
outstanding should be able to calculate the probability and risk of
bankruptcy and increase their interest rates accordingly. 72 These types of
lenders might not have reasonable investment-backed expectations in their
security interests that could make a takings claim successful in the event
of a bankruptcy. 373 It is more likely that an individual or one-time secured
creditor could have reasonable investment-backed expectations regarding
the low risk of bankruptcy. A one-time secured creditor might have a
perfectly reasonable but unrealistic view of the probability of
bankruptcy.374 In addition, the secured creditor might have only
constructive notice rather than actual notice of the statute itself.
Whether notice is actual or constructive is relevant in determining the
extent ofreasonable investment-backed expectations. The Court of Federal
Claims has discussed the difference between actual and constructive notice
in the context of whether a property owner is reasonable in his expectations
in Bowles v. UnitedStates.37 In that case Bowles purchased a residential
lot without actual notice that he would be required to obtain a permit from
the Army Corps of Engineers in order to fill his lot for development.376
Surrounding lots had been filled and developed without obtaining a
permit. 3" The court said:
When the land owner has actual knowledge of the
government regulation prior to purchase, the "notice" defense
Financing,69 TuL. L.REv. 373,383-85 (1994); Paul Slovic et al., PreferenceforInsuringAgainst
ProbableSmall Losses: InsuranceImplications,44J.RISKAssEssMENT 237, 253 (1977); Neil D.
Weinstein et al., PromotingRemedial Response to the Risk of Radon:Are InformationCampaigns
Enough?, 14 Sci.TtCH. & HUM. VALUES 360,370 (1989). Butsee RogerG. Noll & James E. Krier,
Some Implicationsof Cognitive Psychologyfor Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 755
(1990) ("[P]eople behave as if they think that low-probability events are more likely than their own
beliefs about the probabilities would suggest... ."). The results of various studies show that people
buy more insurance against moderate- or high-probability, low-loss events than against lowprobability, high-loss events. See Slovic, supra, at 253.
371. Professor Mann provides casual empirical support for this proposition based on
interviews with lending executives at three companies. See Ronald J. Mann, Strategy and Force
in the Liquidationof Secured Debt, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 159, 241-43 (1997). The banking executive
he interviewed said that loan officers "don't think or give one hoot about bankruptcy/workout
scenarios. They hope to hell it won't happen... ." Id. at 242.
372. But see id. at 241-43 (discussing views of lending executives with large institutional
lenders).
373. However, it may be improper to consider a lender's entire portfolio of security interests
in determining that there are not sufficient investment-backed expectations in one.
374. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
375. 31 Fed. Cl. 37,51 (1994).
376. See id. at 42, 43.
377. See id. at 43.
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makes economic sense. A rational buyer who has actual
notice of government land-use regulations prior to purchase
will consider the risk that use may be restricted when deciding
how much to pay. That is, the rational buyer is compensated
for this risk up front by purchasing the property at a discount.
Though, of course, the seller may have a valid taking claim.378
In holding for Bowles, the court noted that a reasonable person would have
believed that a permit was not required for building.379 Therefore, the
reasonable belief of a secured creditor about the current state of bankruptcy
law as well as about the risk of bankruptcy would be relevant in
determining the extent of the secured creditor's investment-backed
expectations.
Courts have not elaborated on what makes expectations "investmentbacked." But one possibility of the meaning of the term is the ability of the
owner to compensate for known limitations with respect to property rights
by paying less for the property. If a limitation attaches to particular
properties, then purchasers can compensate by paying less for those
properties than for properties without similar limitations.380 Therefore, if
a party knew that a property encompassed wetlands and that the
government could prohibit development of the wetland areas, that party
would pay less for the property than for property without wetlands. The
loss of the government regulation would fall on the party that owned the
property at the time the regulations were adopted, and the real issue would
be the extent of the regulation. Only those secured creditors involved in a
large number of transactions would have the ability to compensate for a
limitation that affects all security interests but that only causes a loss in the
event of some unpredictable future event.38 '
Finally, even if investment-backed expectations are "dubious," it is still
possible to find a taking if the other factors are strong enough. The
Supreme Court found a taking in Irving despite finding the extent of
investment-backed expectations to be dubious.382 Because the Court found
the character of the regulation to be extraordinary, the Court found a taking
despite the lack of investment-backed expectations.383 The Court found that
"the regulation... amounts to virtually the abrogation of the right to pass
on a certain type of property-the small undivided interest-to one's

378. Id. at 51.
379. See id.
380. For example, a purchaser would pay less for property that encompassed wetlands than for
property without wetlands.
381. See supra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
382. Irving, 481 U.S. at 715.
383. See id. at 716.
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heirs. '"384 The Court went on to say that the right had been part of our legal
system since feudal times."' Irving predated Lucas, in which the Court
announced that some types of takings were categorical and did not require
the consideration of the ad hoc formula.3 86 The only consideration of the
investment-backed expectations factor in categorical takings, of course, is
with respect to background principles of property. Therefore, Irving is
consistent with Lucas if the taking in Irving is equivalent to a categorical
taking. Where a property interest like a security interest is completely
destroyed, especially with respect to real property, it could be treated as
equivalent to a categorical taking.
In conclusion, notice is certainly relevant in determining the extent of
a secured creditor's reasonable investment-backed expectations. However,
the Supreme Court has rejected a strict notice rule that would preclude the
finding of a taking in the event a secured creditor had notice of the
invalidation of the security interest in the event of bankruptcy. Because of
the uncertainty of a bankruptcy, a secured creditor might be reasonable in
the expectation of retaining a security interest. In addition, because a
secured creditor could not avoid the possibility of losing the security
interest by avoiding a particular type of security interest or collateral, the
secured creditor might have reasonable investment-backed expectations.
Finally, even if the reasonable investment-backed expectations factor is
weak, a court could still find an unconstitutional taking based on the
strength of the other factors in the formula.
3. Comparing Destruction of Other
Property Rights in Bankruptcy
Although the invalidation proposal applies only to invalidate security
interests, Congress could conceivably destroy other property rights in
bankruptcy. Many of the same types of arguments would arise, so it is
useful to explore some of these possibilities. If Congress could
prospectively refuse to recognize security interests, then Congress could
also refuse prospectively to recognize a tenant's possessory interest under
a lease from a bankrupt landlord," 7 the rights of a co-tenant of a bankrupt
property owner,388 the rights of mineral or royalty interests in land owned

384. Id.
385. See id.
386. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at2893.
387. In Chapter 7, the trustee would be able to sell the property free and clear of a burdensome
lease. In Chapter 11, the debtor in possession would be free to lease the property at market rental
rates.

388. Current bankruptcy law permits the property to be sold free and clear of the interest of
a co-tenant under certain circumstances if the co-tenant is compensated for the value of the interest,
but this proposal would not contemplate compensation.
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in fee by a party in bankruptcy, or even the rights of a purchaser of
property from a party who is subsequently in bankruptcy.389 With
prospective legislation, these owners of property interests would have
notice of the limitation on their interests at the time of the creation of their
interests. Arguably, they would have the option to simply avoid acquiring
the property interest at all. The only ability that the purchasers of property
interests would have to avoid the loss would be to assess the financial
stability of the seller of the interest. Otherwise, to the extent the parties
needed to lease, own in co-tenancy, own mineral interests, or purchase
property, they would be unable to protect themselves from the risk of
losing their interests in bankruptcy.
Can a security interest be distinguished from any of these interests? One
distinction between a security interest and the interest of a tenant, cotenant, or purchaser is that a security interest is a non-possessory interest,
so there is no physical invasion. But if a security interest really is a
property interest, then the loss of a security interest is just as much an
appropriation or destruction. The royalty interest, treated as an interest in
property in many states, 390 is also a non-possessory interest. Even with
notice, the appropriation of non-possessory interests in property, such as
security interests and royalty interests, seems to cross the line and go "too
far." Therefore, a court should find an unconstitutional taking even with
respect to the prospective appropriation of an interest in property.
4. Distinguishing Lien Avoidance and
Lien Priority Provisions
Scholars have assumed that because current law imposes limitations on
the rights of secured creditors, additional or different limitations on their
rights would not create a takings problem. 391 For example, they could argue
that if liens can be avoided in bankruptcy, they can be ignored altogether.
However, the takings determination is an ad hoc determination. that
389. This would permit property previously sold by a debtor to be brought back into the
bankruptcy estate free and clear of the interest of the purchaser. As preposterous as this sounds as
an actual amendment to bankruptcy law, it illustrates an argument made by Professors Steven Harris
and Charles Mooney that the creation of security interests should not be any more suspect than
other transfers of property interests. See Harris & Mooney, supra note 2, at 2041. Harris and
Mooney say that sales of assets, "like secured loans, can result in wealth transfers from the
unsecured creditors of a... seller and can expose the unsecured creditors to additional risk...
Id.
390. See Coastal Petroleum v. Chiles, 701 So.2d 619, 623 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Wedel v.
American Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 681 N.E.2d 1122, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997); Fritschen v.
Wanek, 924 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Elenbaas v. Department of Treasury, 585
N.W.2d 305,307 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Will of McConville, 639 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345 (App. Div
1996); HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 890 (Tex. 1998).
391. See supra Part III.E.
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requires the consideration of facts specific to the particular situation. I will
distinguish the invalidation proposal from avoidance provisions under
current bankruptcy law as well as from statutes that give priority to certain
types of hens.
If a prospective invalidation of security interests can create a takings
problem, then why are avoidance provisions, which invalidate certain
security interests prospectively, constitutional? First, some of the
avoidance provisions are based on state law" or on provisions in earlier
bankruptcy statutes.393 As a result, they may constitute background
principles of property law that define the security interest, unlike recent
enactments. In addition, some of the provisions only permit the avoidance
of transfers of security interests that give the secured creditor a windfall,394
and, therefore, the secured creditor would not have reasonable investmentbacked expectations. Finally, some of the provisions affect only certain
types of collateral,395 so secured creditors can avoid losing a security
interest by not taking a security interest in this type of property at all. For
these reasons, the avoidance provisions do not present a takings problem
and can be distinguished from a general invalidation of all security
interests in bankruptcy.
The invalidation proposal can also be distinguished from statutory
grants of priority to particular types of Hens, such as ad valorem tax liens,
mechanics' liens, and certain environmental liens.3" These types of
statutory grants of priority have been upheld so long as they are applied
prospectively. One reason these statutes do not present a takings problem
is that the secured creditors receive a benefit related to the prior lien. 397 For
example, work done by a contractor resulting in a mechanics' lien or

392. For example, section 544(a), which permits the avoidance of unperfected security
interests, and section 548, which permit the avoidance of fraudulent transfers, are based on state
law principles. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a), 548; supra notes 241,247 and accompanying text.
393. Section 547, which permits the avoidance ofpreferential transfers, is based on an earlier
statute. See 11 U.S.C. § 547; supra note 262 and accompanying text.
394. Section 548 permits the avoidance of fraudulent transfers and section 547 permits the
avoidance of preferential transfers. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548; supra notes 245, 260 and
accompanying text.

395. Sections 522(0(1) and 522(0(2) apply only to exempt property. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522
(0(1), 522(0(2); supra notes 250, 255 and accompanying text.
396. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-7-516 (Michie 1987) (environmental superlien).
397. See Kessler v. Tarrats, 466 A.2d 581,596-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1983), aff'd, 476

A.2d 326 (1984); Douglas C. Ballantine, Note, Recovering Costsfor Cleaning Up Hazardous
Waste Sites:An ExaminationofState SuperlienStatutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571,587 (1988). This would

not be the case if a superlien attached to a property other than the hazardous waste site. See
generallyBallantine, supra, at 584 (discussing one such statute which was revised to apply only
to the waste site); David G. Butterworth, Comment, State Superfund Superliens: Who Do They
Lean On?, 1 VILL. ENVTL L.J. 163 (1990) (stating that superlien provisions in effect at that time

imposed the lien only on the affected property).
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environmental cleanup resulting in an environmental superlien increase the
value of the property securing the secured creditor's claim. Therefore,
these grants of priority are no different for the secured creditor whose
priority has been displaced than for the property owner on whose property
a lien has been placed. Another reason that the statutes have been upheld
is that the secured creditor has notice of the statutory scheme prior to the
attachment of a security interest.39 Because the types of liens to which this
statutory priority are given are limited in type, the secured creditor has
some ability to plan and avoid the attachment of liens altogether.399
Secured creditors take steps to avoid the attachment of mechanics' liens,
and they may monitor a borrower's operations to confirm compliance with
environmental laws. This ability to use information about the priority
scheme to avoid the attachment of a prior lien would preclude a secured
creditor from having expectations about priority that are "investmentbacked."
Scholars have proposed that involuntary creditors such as tort claimants
be given priority over secured creditors as well as over other unsecured
creditors.' These proposals, applied prospectively, would probably not
raise constitutional issues for the same reasons that other priority statutes
do not. Secured creditors could simply require that borrowers obtain
sufficient liability insurance and could monitor the payment of insurance
premiums. 4" Secured creditors would not similarly be able to avoid a
general invalidation provision except by avoiding secured credit altogether.
Ultimately, the assumption that Congress may invalidate security
interests in bankruptcy altogether by acting prospectively is doubtful.
Although the extent of the secured creditors reasonable investment-backed
expectations may be small, the character of the governmental action, an
appropriation or destruction of a property interest, is, as in Irving,
extraordinary.' The economic impact may also be quite significant.
Furthermore, from the point of view of owners of property at the time the
legislation was passed, a significant right, the ability to convey a security
interest that can withstand bankruptcy, is destroyed. Therefore, it is
doubtful that the invalidation proposal would survive a takings challenge.

398. See Ballantine, supra note 397, at 592.
399. Secured creditors routinely monitor a borrower's payment of taxes, environmental
practices, and construction in order to avoid having prior liens attached.
400. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
401. Secured parties currently require casualty insurance and monitor the payment of
premiums there. Insurance policies include a mortgagee clause which provides that the policy
cannot be canceled without notice to the mortgagee.
402. Eastern Enterprises represents the opposite case. There, the investment-backed
expectations were significant, and the character of the governmental regulation, the imposition of
liability, was a much less significant factor. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131, 2133
(1998).
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More recently, scholars have made more modest proposals regarding the
treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy. I will now turn to a
discussion of one of these proposals.
C. The PartialPriorityProposal
Professors Bebchuk and Fried recently published an article that has
increased the intensity of the debate over the priority of secured creditors
in bankruptcy. In their article, Professors Bebchuk and Fried proposed that
secured creditors receive only 75% of the amount of their secured claims,
treating the remainder of the claims as unsecured and reserving the
remaining collateral value for payment of unsecured claims.' 3 Professors
Bebchuk and Fried did not discuss the takings issue in their first article and
discussed it only briefly in their second.' In their second article, they did
consider the takings issue from the point of view of the property owner as
well as the secured creditor.' °5 They dismissed the secured creditor's
argument on the basis of notice and the owner's argument on the basis that
limitations on the right to transfer a security interest do not violate an
owner's property rights since there are currently some limitations
thereon.' They cited no takings cases or scholarship.
With respect to the property owner's point of view, the conclusion
reached by Professors Bebchuk and Fried could be correct.4 7 Under a
partial priority rule, property owners would still have the right to transfer
a security interest in their property. The partial priority proposal would be
less likely than the invalidation proposal to affect the availability of
secured credit and thus less likely to have a negative impact on the
transferrablity of an owner's property.
With respect to the secured creditor's point of view, the partial priority
proposal can be distinguished from the invalidation proposal. One
distinction is the additional dimension to the "denominator problem." 48
With the partial priority proposal, the secured creditor would lose only
25% of the security interest rather than the entire security interest. The
Supreme Court has addressed cases in which less than the entire interest
of a property owner is taken. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the
Supreme Court found a taking where a statute made the mining of certain

403. See Bebehuk & Fried, The Uneasy Case, supra note 2, at 909.
404. See Bebchuk and Fried, FurtherThoughts, supra note 2, at 1290-91.
405. See id.
406. See id.
407. Their reasoning is, however, incorrect. The constitutionality of some limitations on the
rights of property owners to transfer a security interest does not mean that other limitations are
constitutional. See supra part III.E.
408. See supra notes 351-54 and accompanying text.
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In Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
coal impracticable.'
1
0
DeBenedictis, the Court found that a similar statute was not a taking.
Justice Stevens said "There is no basis for treating the less than 2% of
petitioners' coal as a separate parcel of property." 4 However, these cases
involved regulation rather than appropriation of property.
The takings formula could be applied to the partial priority proposal as
follows. First, the economic impact of the invalidation proposal upon the
holder of a security interest could be substantial. The secured creditor
would lose 25% of its secured claim except to the extent of assets available
to pay unsecured creditors. Second, the character of the government
regulation is the same as with the invalidation proposal. The action would
be a destruction of a part of the secured creditor's property interest. Finally,
as with the invalidation proposal, reasonable investment-backed
expectations are arguably not very high since the secured creditor would
have actual or constructive notice of the loss of 25% of the security interest
in the event of a bankruptcy.
In analyzing the extent of the secured creditor's investment-backed
expectations, it is useful to distinguish the partial priority proposal made
by Professors Bebchuk and Fried from Professor Warren's proposal which
applies both in and out of bankruptcy and is of slightly different effect.
Professor Warren proposed a prohibition on secured creditors encumbering
all of a debtor's assets in the first place.412 So what is the difference
between the Warren approach, limiting the extent to which an owner can
encumber property, and the Bebchuk/Fried approach, limiting the priority
of a secured creditor in bankruptcy? Bebchuk and Fried argued that a
strength of their approach is the inability of secured creditors to work
around the restriction. 4 3 Their approach requires a secured creditor to share
in the loss in bankruptcy regardless of how careful or conservative the
secured creditor may have been in making its investment. The Warren
approach, on the other hand, would restrict secured lending to some extent,
since debtors could not encumber all of their assets, but secured creditors
would still be entitled to the most important aspect of their property rights
in bankruptcy. Furthermore, by maintaining a low loan-to-value ratio,
secured creditors could avoid a loss altogether. With the partial priority
proposal, secured creditors could not use prior notice of the partial priority
provision to avoid a loss.
As with the invalidation proposal, the most troubling aspects of the
partial priority proposal are that it encompasses all security interests, it

409.
410.
411.
412.
413.

260 U.S. 393,412-15 (1922).
480 U.S. 470, 504-06 (1987).
Id.at 498.
Warren Memorandum to the ALI, supra note 5, at 1-2.
Bebehuk & Fried, FurtherThoughts, supra note 2, at 1347-48.
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invalidates them (at least partially) as to all unsecured claims, and it cannot
be avoided by prudent investing on the part of the secured creditor. If the
partial priority proposal is considered to be a regulation that reduces the
value of a security interest by 25% or less, a finding of a taking is unlikely.
On the other hand, if the proposal is seen as a destruction or appropriation
of 25% of the secured creditor's interest, the finding of an unconstitutional
taking is more likely.
Because of the significant denominator problem raised by the partial
priority rule and remaining uncertainty in takings law over the denominator
issue, I cannot conclude that it would constitute a taking. However, the
proposal does raise significant and complex issues relating to the takings
determination. Because of the fact-intensive nature of the takings
determination, it is impossible to predict the outcome, and the outcome
cannot be assumed.
V. CONCLUSION

Current bankruptcy law for the most part protects property rights,
including the rights of secured creditors. Secured creditors do experience
delay in bankruptcy in their ability to realize upon their security. However,
only the most egregious case of delay could present a successful takings
claim. Security interests are subject to avoidance in bankruptcy, but only
in limited circumstances that for various reasons do not present a takings
problem.
Scholars have suggested that prospective legislation that invalidates
security interests in bankruptcy would not create a takings problem.
However, the constitutionality of this invalidation proposal is doubtful. All
property owners would be affected by legislation that invalidated security
interests in bankruptcy because they would not be able to create a security
interest that could survive a bankruptcy filing. The right to convey a
security interest may be a sufficiently important strand in the bundle of
property rights that its abrogation would constitute an impermissible
taking. If, because of limitations on the availability of secured credit, the
invalidation proposal substantially interfered with the right of an owner to
transfer land, it would most certainly be an unconstitutional taking.
In addition, the invalidation proposal may be unconstitutional from the
point of view of the secured creditor. Because the proposal would
appropriate the secured creditor's property rights rather than regulate them,
a court could find the proposal unconstitutional without reaching the ad
hoc test of Penn Central.Even if the ad hoc test is applicable, a court could
find a taking. The extent of the secured creditor's reasonable investmentbacked expectations would be limited, but prior notice should not
eliminate investment-backed expectations altogether where the secured
creditor is not taking the security interest in order to create a takings claim
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and has no ability to avoid the possibility of loss. Furthermore, the
economic impact of the proposal could be substantial, and the character of
the regulation, destruction of the secured creditor's property rights, would
be extraordinary. As a result, the constitutionality of the invalidation
proposal is doubtful.
Although other proposals are not as onerous in affecting the property
rights of owners and secured parties, they do still raise substantial
constitutional questions. The takings formula is too fact dependent and
takings law is still in too much of a muddle to make certain predictions
about its application. Scholars making these proposals are ignoring
significant and complex takings issues that may make their proposals
unconstitutional.
Since Professor Rogers' 1983 article, courts and scholars have made
assumptions about the bankruptcy takings problem, most of which are
based on his conclusions. However, their assumptions are not correct. The
Takings Clause does limit the power of Congress to pass new bankruptcy
legislation, even legislation that is prospective. Security interests are
interests in property, and new bankruptcy legislation cannot redefine the
property interest of a secured creditor. Changes in the treatment of secured
creditors in bankruptcy do affect property owners as well as secured
creditors, and their rights must be considered in assessing the
constitutionality of new bankruptcy legislation. Finally, because the takings
formula, in the absence of a categorical taking, requires the application of
a fact intensive ad hoc test, the constitutionality of current limitations on
the rights of secured creditors does not mean that different limitations
would also pass constitutional muster. When the correct assumptions are
made, the bankruptcy takings problem becomes much more complex and
cannot be dismissed with a short paragraph on prospectivity or the
existence of current bankruptcy limitations on secured creditors. The
bankruptcy takings problem is still very much alive and must not be
ignored.

